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“Don’t put my name on it”: Social Capital
Activation and Job-Finding Assistance
among the Black Urban Poor1
Sandra Susan Smith
University of California, Berkeley
From a social capital theoretical perspective, deficiencies in access
to mainstream ties and institutions explain persistent joblessness
among the black urban poor. Little problematized, however, is the
extent to which access leads to mobilization and the social context
within which social capital activation occurs. Employing in-depth
interviews of 105 low-income African-Americans, this work ad-
vances the literature in two ways. First, it suggests that what we
have come to view as deficiencies in access among the black urban
poor may have more to do with functional deficiencies of their job
referral networks. Second, the findings from this study lay the
groundwork for a single, multilevel conceptual framework within
which to understand social capital activation, a framework that
takes into consideration properties of the individuals, dyads, and
communities of residence.
INTRODUCTION
Within the urban poverty literature, social isolation from mainstream ties
and institutions is the basis upon which the black urban poor are pre-
sumed to lack social capital that facilitates job finding (Briggs 1998; Ran-
1 This research was supported in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the
Program on Poverty, the Underclass, and Public Policy at the University of Michigan;
the Russell Sage Foundation’s Visiting Scholars Program; and New York University’s
Research Challenge Fund. For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to
thank Michael Burawoy, Sheldon Danziger, Giselle Hendrie, Arlie Hochschild,
Rosamond King, Mario Small, Stacey Sutton, William Julius Wilson, Alford Young,
Jr., participants of the Summer Workshop of the Institute for Research on Poverty at
the University of Wisconsin—Madison, and Berkeley’s Department of Sociology Col-
loquium. For their research assistance, thanks as well to Meghan Falvey, Christine
Hooker, and Hannah Pierce. Finally, I would like to express my greatest appreciation
to the AJS reviewers, who provided amazing feedback that pushed me beyond what
I perceived my limits to be. Direct correspondence to Sandra S. Smith, Department
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kin and Quane 2000; Tigges, Brown, and Green 1998; Wacquant and
Wilson 1989). As a result, it is argued that absent access to personal
contacts who are able to provide job information and influence hires, even
during strong economic times, members of this group still have great
difficulty finding work (Wilson 1987). Recent evidence suggests, however,
that their social isolation has been exaggerated. These studies provide
convincing evidence that the networks of the black urban poor are larger,
more diverse and wide ranging, and much less detached from the main-
stream than conventional wisdom indicates (Oliver 1988; Hurlbert, Beggs,
and Haines 1998; Newman 1999), thus raising an interesting question. If
social isolation has been overestimated, what is the source of the black
urban poor’s social capital deficiency?
Qualitative research suggests that even when connected to ties who can
provide job information and influence, the black urban poor often have
difficulty mobilizing these ties for job-finding assistance (Jackson 2001;
Newman 1999). In No Shame in My Game, for instance, Katherine New-
man (1999) notes that among the low-wage workers she studied, personal
contacts were vital to the job-matching process, but assistance was not
always forthcoming. Fearing that their referrals would prove unreliable
and would compromise their reputations with employers, a few of her
subjects denied help to their job-seeking ties. Access, therefore, did not
guarantee mobilization.
While the work of Newman and others is noteworthy, it is only sug-
gestive. Without systematic investigations of job contacts’ willingness to
assist, we do not know why and to what extent those in possession of job
information and influence are willing (or disinclined) to provide job-
finding assistance, as well as what conditions have to be met for assistance
to be forthcoming. This study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature,
both empirically and theoretically. First, by exploring the process of mak-
ing job referrals, I systematically document the concerns that the black
urban poor have about providing assistance and investigate the effect
that these concerns have on their general willingness to come to their job-
seeking ties’ aid. Second, because prior research has not problematized
the conditions that facilitate social capital activation during the job re-
ferral process, it is unclear what factors explain variations in job contacts’
decisions to assist their job-seeking ties. Drawing from a wide variety of
earlier investigations, I show that the factors favorable to social capital
activation operate at multiple levels, and I offer a single, multilevel con-
ceptual framework within which to understand social capital activation.
Employing in-depth interviews and survey data of 105 low-income
of Sociology, University of California, 468 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, California 94707.
E-mail: sandra_smith@berkeley.edu
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African-Americans from one midwestern city, I find that those in posses-
sion of job information and influence overwhelmingly approached job-
finding assistance with great skepticism and distrust. Over 80% of re-
spondents in my sample expressed concern that job seekers in their
networks were too unmotivated to accept assistance, required great ex-
penditures of time and emotional energy, or acted too irresponsibly on
the job, thereby jeopardizing contacts’ own reputations in the eyes of
employers and negatively affecting their already-tenuous labor market
prospects. Consequently, they were generally reluctant to provide the type
of assistance that best facilitates job acquisition in low-wage labormarkets
where employers rely heavily on informal referrals for recruitment and
screening.
Social capital activation did occur, however, even in the context of
pervasive distrust and perceived untrustworthiness. An examination of
the job referral process revealed that assistance was contingent on several
factors, including the SES of the neighborhoods in which contacts resided
and the strength of their relationships with their job-seeking ties. How-
ever, decisions regarding the extent and nature of assistance were most
profoundly affected by the interaction between job contacts’ own repu-
tations and job seekers’ reputations. Overwhelmingly, job contacts were
concerned about job seekers’ prior behaviors and actions in the workplace
and at home, as these indicated how they might behave once hired. Given
little consideration were job seekers whose past indicated unreliability
and those whose behaviors were characterized as “ghetto.” Both types
represented high risks. However, job contacts’ decisions to assist also
depended a great deal on their own reputations with employers. Those
held in high regard were generally willing to assist even job seekers of
ill repute. However, as their standing with employers declined, contacts
became far more discriminating.
Thus, this study contributes to the literature on many levels. Findings
indicate that social capital deficiencies of the black urban poor may have
less to do with deficiencies in access to mainstream ties than previously
thought. Instead, the inefficaciousness of job referral networks appears
to have more to do with functional deficiencies (see Coleman and Hoffer
1987)—the disinclination of potential job contacts to assist when given
the opportunity to do so, not because they lack information or the ability
to influence hires, but because they perceive pervasive untrustworthiness
among their job-seeking ties and choose not to assist. Furthermore, to the
extent that social capital activation does occur, I show that decisions to
assist are contingent on several factors, including the SES of contacts’
community of residence, the strength of relationships with their job-
seeking ties, and individuals’ reputations and status. With these findings
in mind, I propose a multilevel conceptual framework that understands
American Journal of Sociology
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social capital activation as a function of properties at the community, the
dyad, and the individual, thus laying the groundwork for future research
designed to test rigorously the hypotheses implied herein.
SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY IN THE STATUS-ATTAINMENT
TRADITION
Access and Mobilized Models
In the process of status attainment, Nan Lin (2001) differentiates between
two types of social capital—accessed and mobilized. This distinction rep-
resents a potentially valuable route for rethinking the relationship between
social capital, job finding, and joblessness among the black urban poor.
Accessed social capital models explain status attainment as a function of
individuals’ network structure and composition (Boxman, De Graaf, and
Flap 1991; Burt 1992, 1997; Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert 1986;
Granovetter 1985; Lin and Dumin 1986; Lin 1999). In contrast to accessed
social capital models, mobilized social capital models are limited to studies
in which personal contacts have been used for instrumental action, such
as job finding. Here, status attainment is explained as a function of the
status of the job contact who provided aid (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981;
Marsden and Hurlbert 1988; De Graaf, Dirk, and Flap 1988).
Having distinguished between accessed and mobilized social capital,
however, a crucial aspect of social capital theory remains underdeveloped.
Access assumed, what explains variation in actors’ ability to mobilize
social resources for instrumental action? After all, individuals’ social prox-
imity to others does not guarantee that the resources attached to others
will be forthcoming, as the work of Newman (1999) has shown and as
Lin intimates: “Not all persons accessed with rich social capital are ex-
pected to take advantage of or be able to mobilize social capital for the
purpose of obtaining better socioeconomic status. An element of action
and choice should also be significant” (2001, p. 92). Observations such as
these call for a thorough examination of the social contexts that affect
the likelihood of social capital activation.
SOCIAL CAPITAL ACTIVATION: TOWARD A SINGLE, MULTILEVEL
FRAMEWORK
If we define social capital as the resources that actors have access to by
dint of their connection to others in groups, networks, or organizations,
social capital activation, at least within the status-attainment tradition,
is the point at which these resources are shared—when one or more actors
provides instrumental or expressive aid to others, beginning or continuing
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a series of nonnegotiated or reciprocal exchanges. This treatment of social
capital activation is consistent with social capital conceptualizations of-
fered by Pierre Bourdieu (1985) and James Coleman (1988, 1990), both
of whom highlight the importance of reciprocal exchanges for social cap-
ital development and the facilitation of its activation. However, it is clear
from earlier work that the factors favorable to social capital activation
operate at multiple levels. These include, but are not limited to, properties
of the individual, the dyad, the network, and the community. Thus, an
important next step is to assemble relevant work into a single, multilevel
framework designed to inform future research endeavors and to help refine
our theories of social capital and its mobilization. Consider the following
an informal sketch of a baseline model.
Individual-Level Properties
Reputation.—According to social exchange theory, social capital activa-
tion is at least in part facilitated by attributes of the individuals involved
in the potential exchange. Specifically, given competing alternatives—
whether or not to assist and with whom to do so—reputation is critical
for determining action (see Granovetter 1985). According to Robert Wil-
son, “Reputation is a characteristic or attribute ascribed to one person by
another” (1985, p. 27). In this sense, reputation is at least in part the
product of one’s network of relations. It is through the network that
knowledge about how an actor behaves in the context of one relationship
spreads to others with whom the actor might deal. Furthermore, the
quality of social judgments is itself conditioned on embeddedness, since
the accuracy with which individuals are judged is only as good as allowed
by the extent and nature of one’s network of relations.2 Nonetheless, the
2 Although Coleman (1988, 1990) has argued that social closure enhances the flow of
information such that accurate assessments of others’ behavior exist for all, others
point to the ways in which structural embeddedness characterized by network closure
actually constrains information flow, making social judgments at best only rough es-
timates of actual quality. For instance, to explain the loose linkage between a producer’s
status and the actual quality of the goods he or she produces, Podolny (1993) points
to an actor’s network of relations as a mediating factor, arguing that embeddedness
can inhibit access to others who are able to provide the latest information about the
quality of products, creating a lag between the time the quality of the product has
changed and perceptions that actors have of the product. Similarly, embeddedness in
a network of relations can constrain access to up-to-date information about one’s
reputation such that it may no longer correspond with one’s most recent behaviors
and actions. Gould (2002), too, cautions against assuming that one’s status is an ac-
curate reflection of his or her qualities. Instead, because actors use others’ judgments
as a general guide for their own assessments of individuals of interest, socially influ-
enced judgments are often amplified such that, as Gould explains, “actors who objec-
tively rank above the mean on some abstract quality dimension are overvalued while
American Journal of Sociology
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opinions and actions of those making social judgments are largely attrib-
utable to the observations they have of actors’ past actions or behaviors.
One’s good name may be determined by others, but others’ determinations
originate from one’s own actions, by and large. Thus, reputation largely
inheres in the individual. It is up to individual actors either to cultivate
or destroy their reputations (see Kreps 1996).
More important, however, is the role that reputation plays in facilitating
social capital activation. Because of information asymmetries, quality is
not often known before an exchange occurs (Shapiro 1982; Podolny 1993),
contributing to the uncertainty of the situation. To reduce perceptions of
risk associated with uncertainty, actors look to reputation on the as-
sumption that past behavior is indicative of how individuals will act in
the future. All else being equal, the greater one’s reputation, the lower
the perceived risk of loss and the greater others’ willingness to partake
in reciprocal exchanges. Reputation, then, acts as a signal, in the formal
economic sense (Spence 1974). It leads to an expectation of quality from
which calculations of risk can be made and decisions about whether and
how to act can be determined (see Kollock [1994] for evidence of repu-
tation’s role in the formation of stable exchange relationships under con-
ditions of uncertainty).
What I have laid out thus far assumes a two-party exchange in which
the reputation of the potential beneficiary is the central focus. The effect
of reputation on decisions to exchange is complicated further in three-
party exchanges where one party, B, acts as an intermediary between two
others, A and C. In such situations, B’s decision to assist A by matching
him or her with C is not only based on whether or not A is reputable;
attention to short- and longer-run consequences requires that B consider
the state of his or her own reputation with C as well. As Wilson states
succinctly,
To be optimal, the player’s strategy must take into consideration the fol-
lowing chain of reasoning. First, his current reputation affects others’ pre-
dictions of his current behavior and thereby affects their current actions;
so he must take account of his own current reputation to anticipate their
those ranking below the mean are undervalued—relative to the baseline scenario, in
which social influence does not operate” (2002, p. 1146). Although Gould’s objective
was to theorize about the persistence of status hierarchies, the analogue to reputation,
another socially influenced judgment, is evident. Burt’s (2001) bandwidth and echo
discussion is also of note here as he, too, takes to task the notion that embeddedness
marked by closure enhances information flow, an argument consistent with a band-
width hypothesis. Instead he argues that closure constrains access to new and different
information by encouraging only the echoing of others’ social judgments such that
these judgments become amplifications of original dispositions, whether positive or
negative. Because of etiquette, information contrary to others’ observations becomes
difficult to share, and thus the accuracy of social judgments is questionable.
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current actions and therefore to determine his best response. Second, if he
is likely to have choices to make in the future, then he must realize that
whatever are the immediate consequences of his current decision, there will
also be longer-term consequences due to the effect of his current decision
to his future reputation, and others’ anticipation that he will take these
longer-term consequences into account affects their current actions as well.
(Wilson 1985, p. 28)
The context of providing job-finding assistance is consistent with such
a three-party exchange. Here, job contacts act as intermediaries—as lob-
byists for job seekers and advisors to employers (see Coleman [1990] for
the distinction between intermediaries as advisors, guarantors, and en-
trepreneurs). Based on job contacts’ reputation, employers will make pre-
dictions about whether or not job contacts’ referrals will pay off, and so
job contacts’ decisions about whether or not to act as advisors to em-
ployers—or how to approach the advisory role—will hinge on their rep-
utations with employers. Among those with sterling reputations, employ-
ers will likely look upon their referrals favorably, assuming contacts’
judgments to be sound. Job contacts, perceiving this, are more likely to
refer their personal contacts. Among those with subpar reputations, em-
ployers will likely think twice, correlating contacts’ past behavior and
actions with those of any referrals they make. Job contacts in this position
are less likely to refer their personal contacts. These are the short-term
considerations.
For those concerned with the long-term consequences of their behavior,
they will also consider job seekers’ reputations. This is because the out-
come of matches will undoubtedly affect their reputations, and thus their
future opportunities. Whether or not job contacts are allowed to assist
again, receive promotions, or get raises may all hinge on the reputations
they develop as a result of the matches they mediate. Thus, if job seekers
are of known ill repute—say they are profoundly unreliable—then job
contacts will not likely refer them to their employers for employment.
However, if the word is that job seekers are reliable, job contacts’ will-
ingness to assist will increase.
But interaction effects must be considered as well. Job contacts with
reputations built on a long history of positive behavior may very well
suffer little from a botched referral, for instance, and thus may have a
greater willingness to assist job seekers whose reputations are shaky, per-
ceiving that their future reputations, and thus future opportunities, will
be unharmed by one or two blemishes. Ill-reputed job contacts concerned
with long-term consequences will have a narrower range of options from
which to choose, however. Bad referrals will only weaken their standing
in the firm, reducing the likelihood that they will be able to take advantage
of opportunities that arise in the future. To optimize outcomes, then, those
American Journal of Sociology
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held in low regard can only hope to improve their reputations, and thus
their competitive edge, by aiding those job seekers who are themselves
held in high regard.
Status.—Social capital activation is likely also contingent on the status
of both job contacts and job seekers. According to Gould, status is “the
prestige accorded to individuals because of the abstract positions they
occupy rather than because of immediately observable behavior” (2002,
p. 1147; cf. Podolny [1993] for an alternative, network-based conception
of status). It is on this last point that reputation is distinguished from
status. Whereas reputation is a signal of quality and an indication of
future behavior that is based largely on prior actions and behaviors, status
is a signal of quality and an indication of future behavior that is based
largely on the positions that occupants hold. In practical terms, it is the
difference between saying, “I know this applicant will do well because
she has performed well” (reputation) and saying, “I know this applicant
will do well because she graduated from an elite university” (status). With
status, there is an assumption that prior actions or achievements at some
point led to one’s position, but it is because of the positions themselves
that occupants are accorded respect or not.
There are at least two ways in which social capital activation may be
contingent on the status of the individuals involved in the job search
process. First, job contacts may decide whether or not to assist based on
the social prestige attached to the positions that they hold. In No Shame
in My Game, for instance, Newman (1999) discusses the social costs of
accepting low-wage work, especially those associated with the fast-food
industry. Besides wages that dwell close to the bottom of the pay scale,
this type of work is stigmatized for the high level of routinization involved,
the lack of autonomy, the perception of limited opportunities for upward
mobility, and the notion that, with fast-food employment, workers must
suppress their feelings of anger and resentment in order to tolerate mis-
treatment occasioned by customers who in numerous ways remind them
of their low social status (Leidner 1993). “Service with a smile” can be
degrading work, affording its occupants little in the way of self-respect,
worth, and social prestige—a serious dilemma, especially for those who
reside in communities where respect is difficult to acquire and easy to
lose (Anderson 1999). As a result, Newman found that it is not unusual
for occupants of positions like these to be maligned, chastised, and ridi-
culed by their network of relations who deem such jobs and what they
stand for to be too unworthy to hold, even in the context of persistent
poverty. Thus, job contacts occupying positions held in such low regard
may choose not to share the information that they have nor to influence
hires, perceiving that others in their network will be loath to consider
their offers and indeed may take the opportunity to remind job contacts
Social Capital and Job-Finding Assistance
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of their own unwise choice. Indeed, one of Newman’s teenage subjects
was so fearful that he would be the subject of mockery and derision by
his friends that he withheld from them his place of employment.
Job seekers’ status likely matters as well. Just as reputation signals to
job contacts how job seekers might behave posthire, job seekers’ current
status also provides indications of likely future behavior if only because
one’s current status is perceived to be at least in part a function of the
quality of one’s character and past performance (Frank 1988; Gould 2002).
Thus, job contacts’ willingness to assist their job-seeking ties will likely
depend on such factors as whether or not job seekers are currently em-
ployed, receive public assistance, have been convicted of a crime, have
graduated high school, or are enrolled in college. In the minds of dis-
criminating job contacts, each of these factors has relevance for deter-
mining the quality of character associated with their job-seeking ties,
which will likely bear heavily on how they will behave in the future.
Dyadic Properties
Strength of tie.—Drawing from the literature on social exchange, wemight
also conceptualize social capital activation in terms of properties of the
dyad. This is because, independent of the status and reputations that
individuals have developed outside of the context of the relationship, trust
and trustworthiness can develop between potential exchange partners in
such a way that facilitates instrumental aid (Burt 2001; Cook and Hardin
2001). According to Peter Blau (1964), trust and trustworthiness in dyadic
relationships emerge from a history of successful reciprocal exchanges.
The initiation of informal exchange relationships is typically characterized
by relatively small-scale exchanges, such as borrowing or lending a book.
As these smaller obligations are honored and riskier exchanges are un-
dertaken with success, uncertainty about exchange partners’ reliability
declines, and trust between partners grows (Kollock 1994). Iterated ex-
changes also have a tendency to breed stronger, more cohesive and af-
fective bonds (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). For both of these reasons,
the likelihood that future exchanges will occur increases (Molm, Taka-
hashi, and Peterson 2000). Unpaid obligations, on the other hand, lead
to distrust and erode the chances of long-term exchanges since actors
whose credits go unpaid will likely withdraw from future exchanges or
change the extent and nature of the exchanges to which they do commit.
As Burt explains, “Where people have little history together, or an erratic
history of cooperation mixed with exploitation, or a consistent history of
failure to cooperate, people will distrust one another, avoiding collabo-
rative endeavors without guarantees on the other’s behavior” (2001, p.
33). Under these conditions, the likelihood of partaking in obligations of
American Journal of Sociology
10
exchange declines precipitously, and with it, too, does the likelihood of
social capital activation.
Properties of the Network: Social Closure
In addition to properties of the individual and the dyad, social capital
activation is also theorized to be affected by properties of the network.3
Specifically, Coleman (1988, 1990) proposed that actors are not likely to
activate social capital unless embedded in networks characterized by so-
cial closure. Typically found in smaller communities, social closure de-
scribes network relations that are dense, overlapping, and close-knit. Ac-
cording to Coleman, closed communities facilitate social capital activation
by promoting trustworthiness, or what he called “trustworthiness in struc-
tures.” Such a network structure allows for the emergence of effective
social norms and sanctions that regulate behavior. Because ties are dense,
overlapping, and close, everyone is either directly or indirectly connected
to all others through short chains. The information channels that these
connections create pass news and gossip throughout the network. As a
result, there is little that anyone can do without having others in the
network discover their actions. This monitoring capacity is key if sanctions
are to be imposed for noncompliance, and if members are to be kept in
line.
While not necessarily trusting others in the encapsulated-interest sense
of the term (see Hardin 2002, but also Cook and Hardin 2001), embed-
dedness in networks characterized by social closure provides actors with
community-backed assurances that potential exchange partnerswill honor
obligations or face appropriate sanctions, such as shunning or social ex-
clusion. These assurances reduce the risks associated with reciprocal ex-
changes, and they pave the way for extensive and long-term obligations,
fertile ground for social capital activation (see also Granovetter 1985).4 A
3 This is not to say that properties of the dyad and network are unrelated, however.
Research by Lawler and Yoon (1996, 1998) has shown that network structures do
affect the strength, cohesion, and affect of dyadic relations embedded in them. Certain
network structures facilitate repeated exchanges between members of similar power.
To the extent that these are successful, it leads to greater trust, cohesion, and emotional
affect between them that promotes commitment to the dyad, even when superior
options to exchange become available. Thus, network structures are not inconsequen-
tial to dyad cohesion or closeness. However, this relationship will not be considered
in this work.
4 Burt (2001) argues that although social closure may indicate when it may be safe to
trust, it does not necessarily produce conditions that make trust advantageous. This
is because closure does not place individuals in the optimal space for taking advantage
of new opportunities in the way that embeddedness in a network rich with structural
holes might.
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wonderful empirical example is Edwina Uehara’s (1990) examination of
the effect network structures have on the ability and willingness of re-
cently jobless, poor, black women to mobilize their ties for instrumental
aid. She discovered that women embedded in high-density, high-intensity
networks were more likely to engage in generalized exchanges thanwomen
embedded in networks of low density and low intensity, because they
were better able to control each others’ behavior through tracking, mon-
itoring, and sanctioning, which created an environment of trustworthiness
that promoted extensive exchanges. Gerald Suttles’s (1968) rich ethno-
graphic account of racial and ethnic differences in ethnic solidarity in one
“slum” community also implicates loose network structures and relatively
poor monitoring capacities with pervasive distrust and noncooperation
among its black residents.
Properties of the Community: Concentrated Disadvantage
Drawing from social disorganization theory, social capital activation is
also conditioned upon structural properties of communities, specifically
the community’s SES, the extent of its ethnic heterogeneity, and the
amount of residential mobility into and out of its borders (Shaw and
McKay [1942] 1969; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson, Morenoff, and
Earls 1999). All three structural factors are theorized to affect both the
density of network relations—the extent to which networks can be char-
acterized as closed—and the links between local institutions within com-
munities. These then shape the development and maintenance of common
values and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation and com-
munity problem-solving behaviors among residents.
For the purposes of this discussion, however, the SES of communities
looms largest. In his seminal work, The Truly Disadvantaged, William
Julius Wilson (1987) argues that as a result of deindustrialization and the
exodus of the black middle and working classes from what were once
vertically integrated communities, the past 30 years has seen a tremendous
growth in the proportion of the black urban poor who reside in neigh-
borhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage. Not only are these
communities marked by high to extreme poverty rates, but other “neg-
ative” social indicators, such as welfare receipt, unemployment, and fe-
male headship, are also at acute levels (Wacquant andWilson 1989; Samp-
son et al. 1999; Sampson and Wilson 1995). In a context of concentrated
disadvantage, Wilson contends, social capital activation is very unlikely
because residents, lacking regular contact and sustained interaction with
mainstream ties and institutions, have few social resources from which
to draw. Their isolation has impeded the development of personal rela-
tionships that would otherwise serve as sources of expressive and instru-
American Journal of Sociology
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mental aid. Thus, for instance, residents of neighborhoods characterized
by concentrated disadvantage are less likely to have a current partner or
a best friend (Wacquant and Wilson 1989). In addition to social resource
deprivation, the general lack of material resources means that little or
nothing is available to support the development or maintenance of com-
munity organizations in which residents can come together to achieve
common goals, in the process of which they could forge common values
and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation (Sampson et al.
1999).
Social disorganization theory also advises that, controlling for access
to resources, social capital activation is also less likely to occur among
residents of communities characterized by concentrated disadvantage.
This is because, consistent with decades of anthropological investigation
(Banfield 1958; Carstairs 1967; Foster 1967; Aguilar 1984) and some so-
ciological accounts (Liebow 1967; Suttles 1968), concentrated disadvan-
tage also breeds pervasive distrust. Chronic economic hardship and a
history of exploitation diminishes both individual (Pearlin et al. 1981) and
collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1999; Morenoff, Sampson, and Rau-
denbush 2001), leading to high rates of crime, substance abuse, violence,
and neglect. The vulnerability and pervasive distrust that residents ex-
perience in this context fuel individualistic approaches to getting things
done, as illustrated in more recent accounts, such as Elijah Anderson’s
Code of the Street (1999) and Furstenberg et al.’s Managing to Make It
(1999). Thus, relative to poor residents of comparatively affluent com-
munities, the likelihood of mobilizing one’s network of social relations in
the neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage is low. To
the extent that residents do cooperate or assist others, it is solely within
the context of close friendship ties, for, as Peter Kollockmakes clear, “faced
with a situation in which one can be taken advantage of, a natural re-
sponse is to restrict one’s transactions to those who have shown themselves
to be trustworthy” (1994, p. 318).
Summary
To sum up, based upon previous work, a baseline model of social capital
activation (e.g., the probability that job seekers will receive job-finding
assistance from job contacts with whom they are connected) would take
into consideration properties of the community, the network, the dyad,
and the individual. On the community level, we would be concerned with
the extent of concentrated disadvantage, as social capital activation is
theorized to be lower in communities so characterized because of the way
in which the development of strong, cooperative networks is impeded and
because of the ways in which concentrated disadvantage breeds vulner-
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ability and pervasive distrust. On the network level, we would be con-
cerned with the degree of social closure, based on prior research linking
social capital activation to embeddedness in networks of ties that are
dense, overlapping, and close. On the dyadic level, we would be concerned
with the strength of relationships between potential exchange partners.
The stronger the relationship, the greater the likelihood that partners have
taken part in iterated, reciprocal exchanges that build trust, emotional
affect, and cohesion, thus facilitating further cooperation. And on the
individual level, we would be concerned with the reputations and statuses
of job contacts and job seekers. Social capital activation is more likely to
occur if contacts perceive that the interaction between their reputations
and that of their job-seeking ties produces little risk to their future op-
portunities. Finally, if job contacts’ status puts them at risk of losing face,
social capital activation is unlikely, and contacts are unlikely to provide
assistance to job seekers whose own status indicates low character or
mediocre past behavior.
THE STUDY
This study is centrally concerned with uncovering the conditions that
enable black, urban, poor job seekers to mobilize their network of relations
for job-finding assistance. To this end, two basic questions are explored:
1. First, when in possession of job information and/or influence, to what
extent are the black urban poor willing to assist their job-seeking
ties?
2. Second, under what conditions are job contacts willing to extend
job-finding assistance? Specifically, to what extent are decisions to
assist affected by properties of the individual, the dyad, the network,
and the community?
By addressing these central questions, I hope to advance current debates
that have generally overlooked the process of activation by offering a
single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand the
context of its occurrence.
Data
Between 1999 and 2002, data were gathered using surveys and in-depth
interviews of 105 low-income African-Americans.5 The primary site for
5 Although 105 in-depth interviews were completed, time constraints prohibited two
respondents from completing the survey as well. Thus, completed surveys total 103.
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recruitment was one state social service agency (“the center”)6 located in
southeastern Michigan that offered a variety of programs designed to aid
the transition to labor force participation from unemployment, public
assistance, or a current dissatisfying job. These programs included edu-
cation, training, and employment programs, including GED classes for
high school dropouts, child care referral services, and transportation ser-
vices. Although the center claimed to cater to all of the county’s residents,
the majority of clients were black. Many single mothers on public assis-
tance, who were required to spend several hours each week looking for
work, would fulfill this requirement by browsing the employment section
of the local newspapers or by accessing job bank Web sites on computers
that the center provided. To increase their chances of finding work, several
took advantage of the GED, job search, and career counseling classes the
center offered.
Because of welfare reforms that require welfare applicants to name the
fathers of their children, young men are now being held accountable for
their children. Ordered by the court to pay child support, employed fathers
visit the center between work shifts to find a better-paying job; unem-
ployed fathers stop by hoping to learn about any job. Both are motivated
by the desire to stop or, more realistically, slow their child support arrears.
However, childless young men and women also stop by to browse local
papers, surf the Internet, call employers, and submit re´sume´s via fax or
the Internet. All of the above people would also make use of staff members
who recruited and screened applicants for local employers willing to hire
from this low-skilled population and who encouraged job seekers to attend
weekly job fairs. It is largely from this general population of center clients
that this sample was drawn.7
With the assistance of center staff, subjects who fit the study criteria
were recruited. Sought for participation were black men and women be-
tween the ages of 20 and 40 who resided in this southeastern Michigan
city and who had no more than a high school diploma (or GED).8 Re-
6 The names of interviewees and institutions used throughout this article are
pseudonyms.
7 Two-thirds of the sample were recruited at the center. See app. A for details about
all of the recruitment methods employed to complete data collection and the potential
impact on results.
8 Although a few participants did not match one or more of the screening criteria,
every respondent can be categorized as economically marginal. Three respondentswere
below 20 years old; two were over 40 years old. Because the center served the entire
county, the poor from other cities and townships in the immediate area also used the
center. Eighteen respondents reported residences outside the community. Among high
school graduates, 54% reported taking one or more courses at the local community
college. Two college-educated respondents are also in the sample. However, their in-
clusion in analyses does not alter results.
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spondents were surveyed about their family background, networks, em-
ployment history, and job-finding methods. They were also questioned in
depth about their childhood (including childhood impressions of work);
marriage, relationships, and children; employment history, experiences,
and impressions of work; job referral networks; philosophy of employ-
ment; and attitudes and opinions about the extent and nature of job
opportunities for low-skilled workers like themselves. Questions posed to
respondents regarding the process of finding work are displayed in ap-
pendix B. Interviews averaged two hours.9
Displayed in table 1 are mean sample characteristics. At roughly 28
years of age, 78% of the sample had never married, and 75% had chil-
dren—2.5 on average. Of the sample, 84% were high school graduates
(or had gotten a GED), and just over half were employed. On their current
or most recent job, respondents’ mean wages were $9.30 per hour (median
p $8.50). Furthermore, because median tenure was only 11 months—
nearly a third had not worked longer than six months—most families
survived on poverty-level earnings. Indeed, one-third of the respondents
were receiving public assistance at the time of the interview (17% of the
working poor and 45% of the nonworking poor; 14% of men and 47%
of women). Nearly half reported having ever received assistance (31% of
men and 68% of women).
Orientation to providing job-finding assistance.—I determined con-
tacts’ general orientation toward job-finding assistance—whether and to
what extent they generally assist—by examining responses to the following
set of questions:
1. When you hear about job openings at your workplace or elsewhere,
what do you do? In other words, do you tell the people you know
about them?
2. Has anyone ever come to you for help in finding or getting a job?
Who has come to you for help and why? What types of jobs did
she/he/they ask about? How did you help, if at all? Would you help
again? Did this/these job seeker(s) get the job(s)?
3. What do you think are the positive aspects of helping others to find
work? The negative aspects?
Those who reported that they usually choose not to assist or who limited
their assistance were deemed reluctant contacts. Comments indicative of
reluctance included, “I kind of even limit my helping people out to where
it won’t affect me” or “First of all, I don’t know a lot of people that have
really looked for employment, and I question the people that I do know.
I don’t think they would take it as serious, and I don’t want to put my
9 All interviewers were African-American.
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TABLE 1
Mean Sample Characteristics
Variable Mean Range
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.4 17–43
(5.9)
Gender (female) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 0–1
Never married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 0–1
Have children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 0–1
No. of children (if parent) . . . . . . . . . 2.5 1–7
(1.4)
High school graduate/GED . . . . . . . .84 0–1
Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 0–1
Hourly wages (in dollars) . . . . . . . . . . 9.30 2.5–23.0
(3.5)
Public assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–1
Currently receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Ever received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Neighborhood poverty rate . . . . . . . . 0–1
Low–moderate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
High–extreme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Note.— .Np 103
name on it.” Open contacts were those who were willing to help almost
anyone who asked. Comments suggestive of openness included “I never
turn nobody down” or “If they come to me, of course I will tell them.”
Properties of the individual: Reputation and status.—To determine the
extent to which properties of the individual affected social capital acti-
vation as well as what these properties might be, I looked to respondents’
responses to the question, “When people you know approach you for help
finding work, how do you determine whether or not you will help?”
Responses to general questions about willingness to assist were also helpful
for determining whether and what individual-level properties were im-
portant. Specifically, if respondents indicated that they made decisions
based on others’ prior behavior (outside the context of the relationship)
and what this might mean in terms of how they might behave in the
future, I coded this as an indication of respondents’ concern for others’
reputation. If respondents pointed to the positions that job seekers held
as an indication of their quality as workers and a signal for how they
might behave with assistance, this was coded as an indication of respon-
dents’ concern for others’ status. For instance, some respondents were
unwilling to assist job-seeking ties who were currently unemployed be-
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cause such a status indicated that they would likely be untrustworthy on
the job. Others appeared far more likely to assist when presented with
job seekers who were already employed but looking for a second job
because this signaled a high level of commitment to the attainment of
individual goals specifically, and mainstream values generally.
This line of questioning also allowed me to ascertain the importance
that contacts’ own reputation and status played in determining whether
or not to assist. With regard to their reputations, I paid attention to how
they characterized employers’ perceptions of them, especially on the sub-
ject of future opportunities. I also considered contacts’ reputations im-
portant if they referred to the effect that prior referrals have had on their
standing in the firm. I noted concern about contacts’ status whenever
they referred to their own social and economic well-being as factors that
either facilitated or inhibited their willingness to assist.
Properties of the dyad: Tie strength.—To ascertain the role of tie
strength, I again examined respondents’ responses to the following ques-
tion: “When people you know approach you for help finding work, how
do you determine whether or not you will help?” I also determined the
importance of dyadic properties by examining responses to general ques-
tions about job contacts’ willingness to assist. To gauge the importance
of tie strength, I looked to responses that indicated that assistance was
provided primarily because of an affective bond or because of a history
of successful exchanges between the job contact and his or her job-seeking
tie that had bred (or not) trust and trustworthiness.
Properties of the network: Social closure.—It is argued that social cap-
ital activation is more likely to occur among those embedded in networks
that are characterized by social closure (Coleman 1988, 1990; Granovetter
1985). For instance, Uehara (1990) determined that recently jobless poor
black women were more likely to mobilize their ties for assistance when
embedded in networks of greater density, intensity, and encapsulation.
Unfortunately, these data do not allow for such a rigorous examination.
Drawing from prior research, however, it is possible to distinguish, in at
least two ways, embeddedness in closed networks from embeddedness in
structures in which connections are far more loose and free floating. First,
within closed structures, information flows through an intricate com-
munication network in the form of “gossip, slander, invective, and con-
fidentiality” (Suttles 1968, p. 105). Within more free-floating networks,
information flow is decidedly less elaborate. Individuals know of their
potential exchange partners’ habits and behaviors in large part because
they see these themselves, or because their partners inform them in one-
on-one conversations. Trusters are much less likely to have other sources
to confirm or deny trustees’ presentation of self and thus are less likely
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to have the information they need to make well-informed decisions re-
garding whom to trust and assist.
Second, within closed structures, sanctions for noncompliance occur on
the collective level, including social exclusion from all things social and
economic. Outside of closed networks, sanctions take place within the
dyad, in the form of withdrawal from future exchanges and/or the rela-
tionship. While examinations of information flows and sanctioning meth-
ods may not be the most ideal way of determining whether or not re-
spondents are embedded in networks characterized by social closure, they
do provide us with some sense, albeit an incomplete one, of the role that
social closure plays in facilitating social capital activation vis-a`-vis other
factors deemed important for the same.
Properties of the community: Concentrated disadvantage.—Respon-
dents’ addresses were matched with corresponding census tracts to de-
termine the family-level poverty status of their neighborhoods. Employing
a variation of the categories of neighborhood poverty concentration typ-
ically used in urban poverty studies, I found that 69% of respondents
lived in census tracts in which rates of family poverty were low to mod-
erate (0%–29.9%), and 31% resided in neighborhoods with many of the
features characterized by the urban underclass literature, with rates of
family poverty high to extreme (30% and above). Not surprisingly, in
terms of social and demographic indicators, low-to-moderate poverty
neighborhoods in which respondents resided differed substantially from
the neighborhoods in which poverty rates were high to extreme. In the
low-to-moderate poverty neighborhoods in which two-thirds of respon-
dents lived, 31% of residents were black, compared to 78% of the residents
in high-to-extreme poverty neighborhoods; 11% of the former had not
completed high school, compared to 26% of the latter; 30% of the former
were not in the labor force, relative to 43% of the latter; 13% of the former
lived in poverty, compared to 43% of the latter; and whereas just 5% of
the former received public assistance, 23% of the latter received assistance.
For this reason, from here on, I characterize high-to-extreme poverty
neighborhoods as neighborhoods characteristic of concentrated
disadvantage.
Finally, it should be made clear that this study examines the factors
that affect decisions the black urban poor make about whether and how
to assist their job-seeking ties. Given that Wilson stresses the importance
of being connected to mainstream ties, however, there are some who will
argue that a better test than the one presented here would be to explore
how middle-class blacks assess the black urban poor’s trustworthiness
and make decisions about whether and how to provide job-finding as-
sistance. While I agree that an interclass analysis is much needed, an
examination of intraclass relations is essential as well. As Newman (1999)
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points out, the urban poor rely on each other most for job finding, and
while the opportunities these contacts provide lead, by and large, to lateral
mobility, the importance of lateral moves should not be diminished, as
they represent the overwhelming majority of job moves and allow the
urban poor to avoid long spells of unemployment. To the extent that these
factors affect social capital activation in ways that further hinder the truly
disadvantaged, an important gap in the literature is addressed.
WHAT FACTORS ENABLE SOCIAL CAPITAL ACTIVATION?
To understand what factors enable job seekers to mobilize their job con-
tacts for job-finding assistance, it is important to first outline the concerns
that job contacts had when placed in the role of job contact. Primarily
for three reasons, those with job information and influence were generally
reluctant to provide the type of job-finding assistance that best facilitates
employment. As shown in table 2, 20% had come to believe that those
without jobs lacked the motivation and determination to follow through
on offers of assistance, wasting contacts’ time and frustrating them. An-
other 10% expressed concern that their referrals were too needy, and that
by partaking in job-finding obligations, they would become responsible
not only for job getting, but also for helping their referrals stay employed,
compounding the stresses in their own overburdened lives. Finally, 70%
feared that, once hired, those assisted would be delinquent, and that they
would act inappropriately, compromising contacts’ own personal repu-
tations and labor market stability. In all, 81% expressed one or more of
these concerns, having little faith that they would not be worse off by
assisting job seekers in finding work.10
These concerns had consequences. Table 3 displays the percentage of
job contacts who expressed reluctance to assist, by concern type. Among
the one-fifth who believed that job seekers generally lacked motivation,
78% were generally reluctant to provide assistance, compared to just 56%
of those who did not express this concern. While 80% of those who feared
that job seekers would be too needy were reluctant to provide assistance,
just 58% of those without this concern were reluctant. Finally, among
those who feared that their referrals would act badly on the job, in the
process ruining their reputations in the eyes of employers, 73% were
reluctant to provide assistance, compared to just 35% of those who did
not express this concern. In all, 71% of those who expressed one or more
10 These are not mutually exclusive categories. While 19% of respondents did not
express any type of distrust in job seekers, 63% of respondents expressed distrust
around one of these three issues, and 19% expressed concern around two of the issues
raised.
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TABLE 2
Respondents Expressing Concerns about Providing Job-Finding
Assistance
Concern Expressed Concern (%)
Major concerns about job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Job seekers are too unmotivated . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Job seekers are too needy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Job seekers are prone to delinquency . . . . . . 70
Note.— .Np 103
TABLE 3
Reluctance to Assist by Concern Type
Concern
Expressed
Concern (%)
Did Not Express
Concern (%)
Major concerns about job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 17
Job seekers are too unmotivated . . . . . . . . . . . 78 56
Job seekers are too needy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 58
Job seekers are prone to delinquency . . . . . . 73 35
Note.— .Np 103
of these three concerns were reluctant to provide job-finding assistance,
compared to just 17% of potential contacts who expressed none of these
concerns.
Given the pervasive distrust that potential job contacts felt around
issues of motivation, neediness, and delinquency, it is a wonder that they
assisted at all. Indeed, some 87% reported that at some point in the past
they had assisted family members, friends, acquaintances, or even strang-
ers who had approached them for job-finding assistance. The question
is, What factors affected the likelihood that job contacts would assist, or
that job seekers’ social capital would be activated for job-finding assis-
tance within the context of pervasive distrust?
PROPERTIES OF THE INDIVDUAL: THE JOB SEEKER
Job Seekers’ Reputations
Without question, job contacts determined whether or not to assist based
on job seekers’ reputations. Indeed, 75% reported that when in possession
of job information and influence, they largely based their decisions on
what they knew of job seekers’ prior actions and behaviors both on the
job and in their personal lives. These signaled to contacts the likelihood
that job seekers would act appropriately throughout the employment pro-
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cess, with particular interest in whether or not job seekers would do
anything to affect job contacts’ own reputations negatively. However, job
contacts rarely made reference to job seekers’ status, such as whether or
not seekers were employed. These results are displayed in table 4 and
discussed below.
Work History, Work Ethic
Is this person staying in a position for awhile? Is this person
the type that goes from job to job to job? That’s not the type
of person I would want to put my name on his application.—
Steve Jackson, age 21
Of the respondents, 38% used job seekers’ work reputations to decide
whether or not to assist. Like employers, they were concerned with
whether or not job seekers had been stably employed, the circumstances
under which they left their last job, the frequency with which they moved
from one job to the next, and how they typically behaved on these jobs.
As one respondent proclaimed, “You’re doing the same thing an employer
would do. Like a reference check.” Job seekers known for having integrity
on the job—by being dependable, dedicated, productive—were held in
high esteem and were readily assisted. Indeed, this was the primary reason
why Jessica Bernard, a 28-year-old unemployed mother of three, aided
her cousin. She explained,
I have a little cousin. She’s 15 or 16 years old, and when I was working
for the university—you know, they have the students that do work, a couple
of hours for lunch and a couple of hours for dinner—and I know she’s a
good worker, so I told her that they were hiring, and I talked to my su-
pervisor, and he told me to tell her to come in, and she filled out the
application, and she started working that day. She was working at [a fast-
food chain], but she had been at [the fast-food chain] for a long time, so I
knew that she would work, especially by her being young. I knew she
would go to work every day, and she gets upset when she can’t be on time,
because her mom’s got problems. So, I told him about her, because I knew
she was somebody who was going to be there.
Jessica determined that her young cousin would be of little risk to her
own reputation because, at such a young age and with enormous obstacles,
her cousin had accumulated a solid record of employment. That she had
been employed at the fast-food chain for some time and took great pains
to arrive at work punctually, in spite of a troubled mother, was evidence
enough of her strong work ethic and general trustworthiness. With a
steady record of employment, job contacts calculated the risk of helping
as minimal and thus were willing to do so.
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TABLE 4
Properties of the Job Seeker Observed to Determine Assistance, by
Gender
Properties of the Job Seeker
Respondents Motivated by This
Property (%)
Total Women Men
Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 69 80
Work (work ethic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 50 26
Personal (ghetto behavior) . . . . . . 43 29 59
Both . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10 5
Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 4
Note.— .Np 103
Where job seekers with stellar reputations were embraced, those
deemed to have a poor work ethic—those who transitioned in and out of
jobs frequently, were habitually absent or tardy, or had a poor work
attitude—were summarily denied assistance or were given weak referrals
to other jobs. Typical were comments such as that provided by Shirley
Wyatt. A 27-year-old unemployed, single mother of four, Shirley ex-
claimed, “If I know what type of person they is, if I know whether they
actually going to get the job and stay at the job, or they one of them
people that, you know, I know after the first two little paychecks, they
going to be quitting, ain’t even no need for me to be telling you because
you ain’t going to be staying there.” Indeed, this was how Cynthia Wilson
viewed her own brother’s relationship to employment. Because of his past
behavior in the labor market, she was skeptical that hewould be consistent
and dependable if she were to facilitate his hire at her job. At the time,
she worked full time at a calling card company making $9 per hour and
learning computer skills. She explained, “First of all, figure out what type
of work history they already have, you know, versus someone like my
brother, for instance. He wanted to get [a job]. I’m like no ’cause you
jump from job to job to job. Can’t do that. Well, he finally found a job
that he liked. He’s been there, I think, for two years now. Now if he came
and said ‘Well, Cynthia, is [your employer] hiring?’ No problem, no prob-
lem.” Even though the job seeker was her brother, with whom she pre-
sumably had a long history, the strength and nature of their relationship
was somewhat inconsequential. Instead, the history of his behavior on
the job interested Cynthia the most, providing her with precedent from
which to deduce her brother’s future conduct. Once he repaired his rep-
utation by working steadily with one employer, Cynthia was willing to
provide assistance.
For whom did work history matter? Women were far more likely than
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men to assess trustworthiness by considering job seekers’ history of em-
ployment experiences. Whereas only 26% of men mentioned work history,
half of the women did. (Possible explanations for this gender difference
are explored in the next section.) Not all contacts assessed trustworthiness
in terms of work history, however. For some, job seekers’ behavior in the
personal realm was most significant.
Acting Ghetto: Bringing the Street to the Job
I don’t want to have nobody at work that’s just obnoxious and
don’t have any sense and just, you know, just totally igno-
rant.—Martin Nevins, age 37
Of the respondents, 43% determined whether or not to assist by consid-
ering how job seekers carried themselves outside of the employment arena.
Of special concern were those whom respondents described as “real
ghetto,” individuals whose behavior included being loud and raucous,
abusing elicit drugs and alcohol, and taking part in criminal behaviors
such as robbing and stealing, because such inclinations would almost
certainly destroy contacts’ reputations. In the form of drug and alcohol
abuse and robbing and stealing, ghetto behavior was little tolerated. As
Cynthia Wilson explained in reference to another job seeker, Cornelia,
“She was like real ghetto, you know. She was heavy off into drugs and
I was like, I don’t think so. You’re not going to make me look bad.” Each
time Cornelia would inquire about job openings at her place of employ-
ment, to save face, Cynthia would lie. She recounted, “I just said they’re
not hiring. Every time. I know one point in time that job got to be hiring,
but I was like ‘They’re not hiring.’ [She laughs.] It’s a freeze!” Because
of Cornelia’s drug addiction, Cynthia could not bring herself to inform
her friend that her employer was hiring. Since that time, Cynthia and
Cornelia have become best friends, and Cornelia now knows that Cynthia
misled her about past job opportunities. However, Cynthia still refuses
to assist her best friend, who has yet to conquer her addiction.
In situations where contacts were embedded in networks of relations
in which a number of people had problematic reputations, the thought
of providing job-finding assistance caused great concern. This was Robert
Randolph’s issue. Robert was a 32-year-old unmarried and unemployed
father of three. When asked how he determined whether or not to assist
his job-seeking ties, he explained, “You know, because I know a lot of
people that smoke rocks, you know and do drugs and not really serious
about getting out here and finding a job. Those are the people that, you
know, I would say ‘Well, there’s a person out here that may have some-
thing for you, you know, you go talk to.’ I will put him in contact with
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somebody, you know, but I wouldn’t put my name out there and rec-
ommend ’em, you know. I wouldn’t do that, no.” Since so many of his
own friends regularly committed theft and larceny, Monroe Laschley ex-
pressed similar concerns. A 35-year-old single father of three, Monroe
justified, “I got friends, you know, that’s thieves, that want to rob and
steal, you know what I’m saying? How would I be like trying to get them
a job where I’m working at, you know what I’m saying? Then, the boss’s
car come up missing or something, or you know a computer come up
missing.” In these situations, the prospect of providing assistance was
inherently risky, because so many of their friends, family members, and
acquaintances were known to be of such ill repute that job contacts felt
that they could not trust them to behave appropriately.
Lee Boswell had very similar concerns. At 37 years of age, Lee had
recently completed a five-year sentence for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm. He explained that multiple factors—drug and alcohol abuse,
immaturity, and jealousy—converged into murderous rage one evening
in which he had beaten his girlfriend until she was close to death. Since
his release, he had committed a great deal of time to his own rehabilitation.
He was in therapy and had been taking part in alcoholics and narcotics
programs, and, through a temporary employment agency, was working.
His primary goal, he explained, was to learn how to spend time with
himself and to make himself happy. So, when asked how he determined
whether or not to assist his job-seeking ties—several of the inmates with
whom he had been incarcerated had contacted him to gain job-finding
assistance upon their release—he explained, “I would know they character
and what they doing, and if I know they still messing around or drinking
and stuff, then I wouldn’t be able to do it and I would let ’em know,
you know, once you get yourself together, holler at me then. But if I know
that they using or got sticky fingers and stuff like that, I wouldn’t give
no recommendation.” These job seekers constituted huge risks to job
contacts’ reputations and labor market stability. As a result, they garnered
little or no consideration among job contacts.
When expressed as raucous behavior, however, job seekers were af-
forded slightly more latitude. Some, like Henry Wilson, found ghetto
behavior offensive at all times, a sure sign that the offender did not share
his values and attitudes and thus could not be counted on to represent
them well on the job. At 32 years of age, Henry was married with two
children, steadily employed, and a churchgoer. He was proud of the var-
ious roles that he played and took his responsibilities very seriously.When
asked why he was reluctant to provide assistance to job seekers in his
network, he explained,
The conversations that they have. Uh, I’m a very entrepreneurial-minded
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person, try to be a spiritual person, responsible. [This is] not to say that
you gotta be like me, but when you’re talking outside . . . I’m a married
man. I like to look at a beautiful woman—you’re an attractive woman. I
like looking at you, but, you know, I don’t feel like going beyond that.
[Mocking those in question] ‘Oh, let me see if I can sneak around,’ and,
you know, and these people that are consistently talking about drinking,
partying. And I talk about investments or things of that nature or just
general family stuff. They don’t get it, so. It’s over their head, so I just
leave it alone.
Similarly, Gary Hanson, a 31-year-old unemployed, single father of seven,
expressed concern about how job seekers would represent him, explaining,
“If they would be the type of person [to say], ‘Oh man, fuck that bitch,
man!’ you know, that’s not the person I would want to put my name on
the line for.” Statements such as the one Gary quoted, while far from
innocuous, in the context of a private conversation might be interpreted
as such. However, for respondents making decisions about whom to trust
with their names and reputations in the labor market, statements such
as these are a sure sign of job seekers’ vulgarity and boorishness, attributes
that contacts do not want associated with their names. And this was of
no small consequence for Gary. He had once assisted a good friend only
to have his employers dismiss the friend for his absenteeism, cursing, and
intimidation of others. As Gary understood it, “He brought the street to
the job, you know, and you don’t just bring the street to the job. That’s
a total separation.” While they have remained friends, Gary would not
contemplate working with his friend again.
Other contacts were offended only when individuals seemed oblivious
to context. For these contacts, acting ghetto itself was not to be scorned.
Indeed, when socializing with kith and kin, it was quite enjoyable. Prob-
lems would arise, however, when individuals did not take their social
context into consideration. Acting ghetto was fine in private settings, but
one should be very cautious about taking it outside. Job seekers’ inability
to discern the proper context for acting ghetto was the primary reason
Brenda Bowen gave for refusing assistance. So, like Cynthia Wilson, she
often lied to job-seeking ties so characterized about job openings at her
place of employment in order to save face—theirs and her own—as well
as to preserve opportunities to receive assistance in the future. A 36-year-
old separated and unemployed mother of two, Brenda explained,
I hate to be judgmental, but I look at the way this person is reacting. If
you can’t control yourself in public, no matter that you’re not at a job,
you’re out in public and these are people that you really don’t know and
they’re judging you and the only thing they can judge you by is what they
see and you don’t know how to act, you know, you’re speaking ignorant,
you know. Because I been around people like that, you know. Say, for
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instance, I don’t know you and you’re walking past and I’m standing here
with this girl and she’s just cussing and just saying all kinds of ignorant
things. I might say it, but when you’re walking past, I’ll stop.
Contacts like Brenda fear that by assisting job seekers who appear unable
to appreciate the significance of context, once hired, these job seekers
would undoubtedly reveal something about contacts’ private lives that
they would prefer to remain private.
Interestingly, a higher percentage of men looked to these personal habits
outside of the work arena for signs of trustworthiness; women prioritized
work history as a criterion for assessing trustworthiness. Compared to
only 29% of women, 59% of men considered the extent to which job
seekers acted ghetto when deciding whether and how to assist. While it
is difficult to determine with these data why men and women diverge in
the criteria they use to assess reputation, and thus trustworthiness, this
gender difference may be attributable to the frequency with which male
contacts are presented with these issues relative to their female counter-
parts. Given the extent to which networks, particularly job referral net-
works, are segregated by gender (Drentea 1998; Hanson and Pratt 1991;
Smith 2000), male contacts likely encounter male job seekers with greater
frequency and thus run a higher risk of assisting those who are known
for deviant and/or criminal behavior. Female contacts, on the other hand,
likely come into contact more often with female job seekers and thus run
a higher risk of assisting those for whom family responsibility and the
like make it more difficult to get to work regularly and punctually. This
explanation is consistent with prior research that has revealed the different
ways in which inner-city employers perceive black men relative to black
women. Whereas employers often fear that black men will rob and steal
from their businesses, and thus are less willing to hire them relative to
men of other racial and ethnic groups, inner-city employers’ concerns
about hiring black women appear largely around the pattern of absences
and tardiness that they attribute to women’s extensive familial respon-
sibilities (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Neckerman and Kirsch-
enman 1991; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996; Wilson 1996). Gender differ-
ences in assessment of trustworthiness, then, may be linked to differences
in the types of risks that male and female job seekers present to job
contacts.
PROPERTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL: THE JOB CONTACT
Although job contacts relied heavily upon the attributes and positions of
their job-seeking ties to decide whether or not to assist, their own attrib-
utes and positions also affected the likelihood that they would bemobilized
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as well. In other words, independent of the job seekers’ properties, their
own reputations, experiences, and status mattered a great deal. Specifi-
cally, they were far less likely to assist anyone if their own reputations
were sullied or if they had accumulated a history of assisting unmotivated
job seekers. Their assistance was also contingent on their own social and
economic stability, or lack thereof. These results are displayed in table 5.
Job Contact’s Reputation
Because if they going to use my name, I don’t want them
messing around. I don’t want nobody messing up under my
name.—Belinda Canty, age 39
Why were job contacts so concerned about job seekers’ reputations?Over-
whelmingly, respondents were fearful of making bad referrals that might
tarnish their own reputations and threaten their labor market stability.
Roughly 70% (62% of women and 80% of men) feared that if they per-
sonally vouched for referrals, there was no way to assure that their re-
ferrals would show up to work, work beyond the first paycheck, be prompt
and regular, be productive on the job, and/or not steal, curse, fight, or
disrespect authority. At the very least, contacts would experience embar-
rassment for having provided a disreputable referral; at most, they could
lose their jobs as well as future employment opportunities.
Jackie York, a 27-year-old single mother of five children, is one such
example. Although receiving public assistance, she supplemented her in-
come by caring for other children in her home, one of only a few positions
she could envision, given that she had small children of her own. She
had recently become certified by the state to provide in-home day care
and hoped to obtain an advanced license in order to open her own center.
Previously, Jackie had a year-long part-time position making $10 per
hour supervising a cleaning crew. As supervisor, she could influence hiring,
and she described how she helped three friends get jobs. Unfortunately,
none worked out. She first assisted her eldest son’s granduncle. Although
she suspected he had a drug habit, she believed that employment would
get him on the track to recovery. At the very least, she reasoned, it would
do no harm because there was nothing on the job site that he could steal.
Hired on a Tuesday, the uncle worked Wednesday and Thursday, but he
did not arrive to work on Friday, nor did he call. Because he had worked
so well his first two days, helping the crew to complete their tasks one
hour earlier than the norm, Jackie gave him the benefit of a doubt and
decided to guarantee his presence by picking him up before work. On
Monday and Tuesday, this approach worked; by Wednesday, however, it
did not. Within one week of his hire, the uncle was let go, and Jackie
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TABLE 5
Properties of the Job Contact Motivating Decisions about Providing
Assistance, by Gender
Properties of the Job Contact
Respondents Motivated by This
Property (%)
Total Women Men
Work reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 62 80
Status (social and economic stability) . . . . 8 8 9
History of providing assistance . . . . . . . . . . . 20 17 23
Note.— .Np 103
described herself as “looking a little foolish.” In trying to assist the uncle
in getting to work on time, she had arrived to work late as well. In the
process, she began to lose her employer’s trust. She explained, “She’s
looking at me like you ain’t picking up your pieces too well.”
Her employer’s perception only worsened with Jackie’s next two re-
ferrals. She then aided the girlfriend of her eldest son’s father, reasoning
that because their sons were half brothers, the extended family would
benefit. However, her ex’s girlfriend was also unreliable. She worked the
first day, arrived out of uniform the second day (which meant that she
could not work), and did not show at all the third day or thereafter.
Although Jackie believed her third referral, an ex-boyfriend, was a good
worker, her employer found him too slow and fired him without her
knowledge, confirming that her employer had lost confidence in her.
To get job seekers to see these consequences, she reminded them of her
own poor SES and pleaded with them to behave appropriately so as not
to harm her reputation. Perceiving this approach as ineffective, however,
she changed tactics. “I did get smart. I did get a little bit smart. I said,
‘Look, don’t tell them you know me. Just go on in there and get the job.’”
However, Jackie now declines to partake in obligations of exchange
around job finding at all. When asked about the positive aspects of helping
others to find work, she explained, “I’m not the right one to ask that
question. I would just have to say that that’s something you got to do
on your own. I don’t see anything positive right now. I can’t be objective
anymore. ‘No, I ain’t heard nothing about no job.’ You know, I have to
say that because if I say, ‘Well I do know some.’ ‘Oh, for real, girl!’ ‘I
ain’t heard nothing, you know, about your situation.’” Self-preservation
now dictates that she remove herself from the process, which, as with
Cynthia Wilson and Brenda Bowen, includes lying about job opportu-
nities about which she is aware.
Terrance Blackburn, a 22-year-old high school graduate, also refuses
to vouch for job seekers after getting burned by several referrals, a pattern
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that ruined his reputation in the eyes of his employer. When justifying
why he would not help a previous referral again, he explained, “Because
I got a bad reputation from that guy. You know, my manager said, ‘You
bringing me all these people and they don’t want to work.’ So, no, I
wouldn’t stick my neck out there. I’m going to get my head chopped off.
I mean, if they ain’t going to stay, why not put your two weeks in. I
mean, just so I won’t look bad. So [you] quit on the people, [and] they
asking me, ‘Where your friend at?’ It’s just . . . I don’t know.”
Although contacts like Jackie and Terrance were not at risk of losing
their jobs, developing a pattern of bad referrals did diminish their rep-
utations with employers. A pattern of bad referrals indicates that one has
had poor judgment regarding the assessment of others’ character, and
this limits the possibility that employers will consider future referrals. It
may also reduce prospects for promotions. By distancing themselves from
job seekers during the matching process, contacts shield themselves from
the stain of bad behavior and the stigma associated with common, neg-
ative stereotypes of the black urban poor, what several respondents de-
scribed as “ghetto” behavior.
Job loss is possible, however. In the case of referrals who steal or who
are very unproductive, for example, contacts may become implicated by
association, diminishing the trust that employers have in their employees.
Such was the case for Jeremy Jessup. Jeremy was 42 years old, and
although unemployed when interviewed, he survived by making roughly
$7.50 to $8.00 an hour working short stints through temporary employ-
ment agencies. When asked about the importance of using friends, rel-
atives, and acquaintances during this process, Jeremy appeared unim-
pressed. Although he thought personal contacts were helpful for job
finding, he explained that he preferred to find employment on his own,
because if he failed, his actions would not reflect badly on the person who
had assisted him. He did not want anyone to be held accountable for his
actions. However, Jeremy’s hesitancy to provide job-finding assistance
was not based on having abused the trust of previous contacts; he had
been burned by previous referrals himself. As a supervisor for a construc-
tion company contracted to build several homes in the area, Jeremy was
in the position to hire many friends he thought needed employment. How-
ever, as he explained,
I had worked for [the construction company], and they’re building brand
new houses, and I hired a couple of my friends, and when they came to
work, all they wanted to do was sit down and get paid for it. They felt
like they didn’t have to work. They figured, like, you know, instead of
taking a half-hour lunch, you could take an hour-and-a-half lunch and
everything was okay. I was supposed to just let that go. [But] we all got
fired because the work wasn’t getting done. I couldn’t do it all by myself.
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So, no thanks. No thanks. Now I call [the construction company] trying to
get back and they won’t even return my calls.
Jeremy has since assisted a nephew in getting a job, but he is wary of
assisting others. Neglecting to determine the reliability of his friends cost
him his job as supervisor of the construction company and any future
employment opportunities with that firm.
The disinclination expressed by Jackie, Terrance, and Jeremy contrasts
sharply with the orientation of job contacts like Wilson Smith, whose
reputations were still very much untarnished. Wilson, a 21-year-old high
school dropout, linked his ability and willingness to assist in the past to
his good standing on the job. As he explained it, “The jobs that I did
work at, like you know, the ones that I was doing good at like [a fast-
food chain] or the one with [another fast-food chain], I could just pull
people in there, because either the boss was cool with me or I just was
taking care of business.” With an unsullied reputation, he was willing to
act on his job-seeking ties’ behalf knowing that his own positive standing
in the firm would facilitate the hiring of any referrals he made. However,
once job contacts ceased “taking care of business,” making referrals that
led to their own loss in status, the likelihood that job contacts would
provide job-finding assistance diminished substantially. First, as with
Jackie, Terrance, and Jeremy, employers were less likely to allow contacts
with tarnished reputations to make referrals, questioning their ability to
discern trustworthy and employable job seekers. Second, contacts began
to question their own ability to discern the trustworthy from the negligent
and unreliable. With little confidence that their job matches would turn
out well, contacts with tarnished reputations either avoided providing
assistance altogether or only offered assistance that did not link them to
the applicant in the minds of employers. For instance, while they may
have passed along information about job openings, they often provided
the caveat, “But don’t put my name on it,” so that job seekers were clear
that they could not refer to their relationships as a signal of their credibility
on the job.
Social and Economic Stability
. . . always thinking that this might be the one.—Jackie York,
age 27
There were circumstances under which contacts would assist job seekers
of ill repute. Indeed, roughly 8% of respondents indicated that they would
assist almost anyone, regardless of reputation, because they could not
afford to do otherwise, a finding that differed little by gender. Their social
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and economic circumstances were so dire, they felt they could not shun
any opportunity to partake in obligations of exchange that might serve
them in the future. Take Laura Odoms, for instance. Laura was a 33-
year-old single mother of four, who, at the time of the interview, supported
her children with public assistance. When asked about prior occasions in
which she helped others secure employment at her job, she recounted the
following experience,
I used to work at [a motel chain], and I helped a friend of mine get a job.
But instead of her wanting to help to clean the room, she knew people that
stayed in the room where she wanted to go and just sit around and hang
out. And you can’t do that. So the lady, the supervisor kept saying, “Well,
I’m going to let you handle this. You brought her in; . . . I’m going to let
you either handle it or fire her.” And I had to let her go because it was
either me or her, and I had to keep my little job.
Prehire, Laura had counseled the referral, her best friend, about appro-
priate workplace behavior. However, her best friend broke the rules any-
way and suffered the consequences, at Laura’s hands. This incident, in
and of itself, is hardly unique given the accounts that other respondents
relayed of their referrals’ betrayals. What is unusual about this situation
is that Laura explained that she was still willing to assist her best friend—
she remained her best friend even after Laura fired her—if presented with
a future opportunity to do so. The overwhelming majority of respondents
in similar situations were adamant that, at the very least, they would not
assist the particular tie who had acted inappropriately.
Is Laura’s response not irrational? Why continue to assist another, even
a best friend, who seems to show little interest in respecting the terms,
in this case clearly stated, of the exchange? Laura explained her willing-
ness to assist her best friend in the future, indeed her willingness to help
anyone, by pointing to her own precarious economic situation. Because
she herself was struggling to care for her family andwould almost certainly
require assistance from others, her friend included, for various tasks in
the future, she refused to close any door to a potential future exchange.
When asked why she would be willing to provide her best friend job-
finding assistance in the future, she explained, “Because the majority of
my friends are in situations like me, and we try to help each other. Besides,
if I need the help as far as money or a ride or if I need her to watch my
10-year-old, she’s there. And I feel people, especially in my situation, I
don’t have much, and I’m trying to get much because I want my kids to
be dependable. That is, when you get old enough to be on your own, this
is what you got to do.” Laura’s explanation indicates that her willingness
to assist is intricately tied to her own social and economic vulnerability.
Would her disposition toward providing future job-finding assistance sur-
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vive if she had access to stable and safe child care, a steady income, and
reliable transportation? It seems very unlikely. Lacking these, however,
she feels that she cannot burn the bridges she does have, even if her
friends’ behavior is unpredictable and often irresponsible.
For those who struggled with less desperation, however, providing job-
finding assistance was less often a treasure hunt than a chore, requiring
more time and energy than they wished to expend, given their already
overburdened lives. Such was the case for Steve Jackson. Downwardly
mobile at 21, Steve earned $7.50 per hour working full time as a delivery
truck driver. Both of his parents received advanced degrees, and they
raised their two children in middle-class, racially mixed neighborhoods.
Steve himself was working toward a college degree at a major state uni-
versity when he learned that he had impregnated his girlfriend. He then
returned home, planning to work full time to support his child while
taking classes at a local university. Overwhelmed by his responsibilities,
however, his grades suffered, and he dropped out. After leaving school,
he worked as a sales representative with a telecommunications company,
earning $15 per hour. In his next two positions he earned $12 per hour
selling cellular phones. Because of conflicts with management, however,
he quit. With a downturn in the economy, there were few jobs at his
preferred wage rate, and pressed to pay off $2,500 in rising child-support
arrears, he settled for $7.50 per hour driving a delivery truck.
Given the major stresses in his own life, Steve found the task of helping
others emotionally daunting, particularly when close friends were in-
volved. He explained, “It could be a lot of stress, and if you take it seriously
to the point where you’re really trying to get this person some help, it
could be stressful for you. You might meet with them and give them some
ideas and that could be extra things to do, and you know, you got your
own problems without dealing with someone else’s job problems.” This
was especially true because the majority of job seekers who had ap-
proached Steve had few marketable skills. He now refuses to assist unless
job seekers have re´sume´s in hand with which to work. To Steve, re´sume´s
signal that job seekers will not require more time and emotional energy
than he can afford. After all, he, too, was struggling to keep his head
above water. Absent assurances that job seekers would not overburden
him, assistance was unlikely. This was especially the case since he could
conceive of making it without the help of others, particularly those who
sought help from him. Although struggling, he was far from the level of
desperation that Laura experienced constantly. In his position, he was
sure that assistance was more a hindrance than a possible help.
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History of Providing Job-Finding Assistance
My friend once came to me, but when I got him an application,
he never did fill it out. So I said I wasn’t going to do that
anymore.—Richard Byron, age 19
Before turning our focus to properties of the dyad, there is an additional
finding related to job contacts that merits consideration, one that the
greater part of the existing literature has ignored. Specifically, I found
that respondents’ willingness to assist was decisively shaped by their
histories of prior referrals. Indeed, one-fifth of respondents suggested that
they were less likely to provide assistance having all too often come across
job seekers they perceived to be unmotivated—17% of women and 23%
of men. They described situations in which their job-seeking relatives,
friends, and associates would complain about their labor market detach-
ment and would ask for help finding work. Once presented with assis-
tance, typically information about job openings, job seekers would express
interest but not follow through. They would either fail to call the contact
person or neglect to complete the application. A few days later, the cycle
of complaining and requests for assistance would continue.
Many, like Leah Arnold, found this cycle of requests and inaction vex-
ing. At the time of the interview, Leah was 25 years old and working full
time, earning roughly $8.25 providing client assistance in a disabled care
facility. When asked about the negative aspects of trying to help others
to find work, she explained,
It’s their enthusiasm. The negative aspects is, you tell them about it, they
sound like “Oh, for real!” like that, and then the next thing you know, two
weeks later you done told them about five jobs. Two weeks later, “Girl, I
still need a job.” You’re like, okay. “Girl, you better look. You better go
look cause I done told you, and after so many times, hey.” So that’s the
negative aspect is when they don’t have the motivation or the enthusiasm
to go out there and get it even after [it is] right there.
Rolanda Douglass was a 39-year-old mother of four who had recently
been hired full time as a dietary aide at a convalescent home. Having
been employed at six different jobs over the past three years in various
service occupations, she knew the low-wage labor market fairly well.
Furthermore, she remained actively engaged in her job referral network,
hoping to learn about “the job” that would take her into retirement. Her
most recent job, although fine for the moment, did not offer benefits and
only paid $7.50 per hour, a sum roughly $4 per hour less than she estimated
needing for financial security. Constantly searching newspapers andwork-
ing her network, she had learned of many opportunities and passed these
on to those in need. As a result, Rolanda fashioned herself as a major
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source of job information and influence for her network of family and
friends.
However, Rolanda had begun to feel that her efforts at dissemination
and offers to intercede were in vain, because all too often, job seekers
would not follow through. She recounted a recent conversation with a
neighbor, a young single mother on public assistance, who was on her
way to the welfare office to find work. Rolanda informed her neighbor
that her employer was hiring and provided a job description, including
the hours needed, the type of work required, and the wage rate. She
strongly encouraged her neighbor to apply, offering to provide an appli-
cation and to return it when completed. And she did so with great in-
centive. Her employer paid at least $200 for every referral brought in,
and given her low wages, Rolanda had hoped to augment her annual
income through the referral process. However, days after that conver-
sation, her neighbor had still not initiated further contact. Rolanda ex-
plained disappointedly, “Even though you tell ’em about it and they be
like ‘okay,’ it’s like I’m wasting my breath.” Although her disappointment
was mostly caused by the loss of potential bonuses, she also felt less
valuable. If few wanted the resources she had to offer, why bother?
Another respondent collected rental and job applications to supply to
those she deemed in need. Tylea Bond was a 25-year-old mother of an
eight-year-old and an infant daughter. Although she had first given birth
when she was just 17 years old and had been on public assistance within
a year, by the time of the interview, she had accumulated four years of
full-time work experience. She was earning almost $9 per hour at the
local university working in student services; having worked her way up
to what she considered a “pretty good” job with “good benefits,” Tylea
believed that anyone could find a good job, with patience and resolve.
With this in mind, she was keen on assisting others. She collected infor-
mation about housing and jobs and would offer it, oftentimes unsolicited,
in the hopes that other women would use it to better their own lives.
However, she complained that more often than not, recipients of her
attention would not respond, and their inaction infuriated her. She
reported,
I told this girl at my church, she has six kids, and I don’t know what her
living is like, but I keep telling her about this housing up here and stuff.
I don’t like my area that I live in now, but there are low-income housing
areas that are nice in this area, and she will not come up here. And so I
just got totally mad. I got mad, because I’m like, “You’re just stupid,” you
know what I’m saying, “because I’m trying to help you out. I’m trying to
get you ahead, expose you to some things, and you’re not even thinking
about none of that stuff. I’m telling you how much money you could be
making, and you’re not even going to try.” So, it’s just frustrating.
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Frustrated by their perception that the persistently jobless were un-
willing to better their circumstances by drawing from the resources con-
tacts had offered, these contacts had become discouraged. Similar to the
discouraged worker who had had such difficulty finding work that she
or he stopped searching altogether, the discouraged contact was no longer
willing to help because the jobless did not partake in obligations of ex-
change around job information and influence. Tylea had thrown away
her folder of job and housing information. Rolanda had come to believe
that job seekers so lacked initiative that she now requires evidence that
job seekers are committed to employment before she partakes in obli-
gations of exchange. Leah now denies her associates’ requests for job-
finding assistance, instructing them to look for work themselves. Thus,
as with reputational concerns, job contacts’ inclination to assist was his-
torically constructed. The likelihood of social capital activation appeared
reduced as the number of failed attempts accumulated.
THE STRENGTH OF TIES
It’s gotta be a family member.—Mary DuBois, age 27
In addition to attributes and positions of job contacts and job seekers,
social capital activation was also contingent on properties of the dyad.
Roughly one-tenth of respondents determined whether or not to assist
primarily based on the strength of their relationships with job seekers.
Typical were comments such as the following: “It’s gotta be a family
member.” “I think I’d keep it in the family.” Or, conversely, “It depends
on how much I know the person. If I don’t know them, then I don’t
really care too much about them.” Contacts had greater motivation to
assist those with whom they had longstanding relationships, such as rel-
atives and close friends, for two reasons. First, these relationships tended
to be founded on a history of successful exchanges that reduced contacts’
uncertainty about their exchange partners’ reliability, thereby nurturing
feelings of deep mutual trust. Second, with a history of successful ex-
changes, stronger, more cohesive, and affective bonds developed that fur-
ther facilitated reciprocal exchanges.
In part, these two reasons explain why Yvonne O’Neill, a 30-year-old
single mother of two, devoted so much time and energy to securing em-
ployment for her best friend, Danielle. At the time of the interview,
Yvonne was making $190 every two weeks working part time at a family-
owned portrait studio. Over the previous six years, she had held five jobs
averaging 10 months each, most often in health care, assisting with and
monitoring clients’ personal care. Even with her spotty work history, she
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had gained quite a bit of work experience. When asked how she had
helped job seekers, Yvonne provided the following example:
I helped [my best friend] get a job through [a health care center] I used to
work. She was not too familiar with more technical medical things, far as
personal life care. Like she is not comfortable with bathing a person’s
private areas and things of that nature, so they try to get her things that
didn’t require that. But at times some of her assignments required that she
bathe this person or clean their ostomy bags, and things of that nature.
She’ll call me. For example, we are going to go out for the evening or
whatever, and she had to do a client, and she told me who it was, and I
already done that client, and I knew what this entailed. So, what I did, I
said, “I will meet you over there, and I will give her a bath and shower,
you can cook and we’ll be out of there in half the time.” I helped in that
manner. Or, sometimes I’ve had to talk her through ostomy care or urine
ostomy bag. “I don’t know how to change it. I’m going to kill him.” “Oh,
no you’re not. What you do, put your gloves on, make your sterile field,
dah . . . dah . . . dah . . . dah . . . dah.” So, I’ve talked her through it
over the phone. Still had to go over there, make sure she didn’t put the
bag on wrong, but it seems like that helps her become more comfortable
with it, and now she can do it if she has to.
Essentially, Yvonne provided a recommendation, and then trained her
unskilled friend, performed some of her work tasks, encouraged her reg-
ularly, and likely shielded her from job loss. However, even with such a
high level of involvement, Yvonne never spoke about assisting Danielle
as a sacrifice or a burden. Instead, it was a continuation of a series of
material and symbolic exchanges between the two that helped to repro-
duce the long-term obligations of support and encouragement they pro-
vided each other. During Yvonne’s own spells of unemployment, Danielle
would call Yvonne regularly with reports of employment opportunities
after having scoured local newspapers for job listings that matched
Yvonne’s skill set. She would also provide encouragement to ensure that
Yvonne would act. Yvonne continued,
When I am looking for work and I already have a job . . . like say now,
I have like three or four little things I do, keep me busy. If I am looking
for something else, she’ll call me up. She works for YCUA, midnight [shift].
She’ll call me at 3:00 in the morning. “I’m looking through the paper. I
want you to write this down. Okay, call this person in the morning, they’re
doing office work, or they’re doing housecleaning work, or they’re doing
private care. This, that, and the other. They will need some help. Call.”
You know, she will go down the list, and I’m like, “Danielle, it’s 4:00 in
the morning.” [Danielle replies] “I don’t care. Write it down.” You know,
she is very helpful. If I see something, I’ll leave it on her answering machine
or her voice mail, or I’ll call her up and, you know, always whether it be
looking for a better car, looking for an apartment, or see something in the
paper far as like household items, you know, like a garage sale.
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Evident is the mutual trust and affection that Yvonne and Danielle share
as a result of their history of successful reciprocal exchanges. Furthermore,
the fact that their exchanges were not limited to the realm of work likely
cemented the strength of their tie and facilitated Yvonne’s willingness to
aid Danielle in the ways that she did. In other words, in the context of
relationships characterized by such mutual trust and affection, social cap-
ital activation, oftentimes unsolicited, is undertaken with little fore-
thought, even at the relatively high levels of time, energy, and commitment
that Yvonne described.
Close relationships hardly guaranteed that job contacts would assist
their job-seeking ties, however. Job contacts frequently denied assistance
to job seekers they considered close. Cynthia Wilson, the 29-year-old mar-
ried mother of three, declined to aid her brother and her best friend,
judging both to be unfit for employment. Monroe Laschley, the 35-year-
old single father of three, refused to provide assistance to his close friends,
fearing that his employer would inevitably become victim to their re-
lentless thievery. And although he was very sympathetic about his close
friends’ plight of joblessness, Steve Jackson, the 21-year-old downwardly
mobile university dropout, avoided requests for assistance because he was
overwhelmed by the extent and nature of the assistance often required.
Even Yvonne, who without forethought did more than most job contacts
would probably do to aid her best friend, intimated that properties of
individuals mattered most. In other words, overwhelmingly, those in pos-
session of job information and influence were influenced most by indi-
vidual-level attributes, and less so by properties of the dyad, when de-
termining whether or not to assist.
This is not to negate the significance of close ties, specifically, and
properties of the dyad, generally. Instead, what this suggests is that tie
strength serves another function. As Vincent Roberts explained when
asked how he determines whether or not to assist, “I would say family
members, you know, because I know them better. Be around them. You
know, it’s more easier, okay.” In other words, job contacts most preferred
to assist close relations not so much because of the reciprocity that oc-
curred in the past between them, but because closeness provided access
to firsthand knowledge about job seekers’ past actions and behaviors
outside the context of the relationship, reducing information asymmetries
that made it difficult to ascertain the level of risk to which they were
exposing themselves by providing assistance. Thus, although important,
properties of the dyad were secondary. Decisions to assist were over-
whelmingly based on how job contacts perceived the individual-level
attributes of their job-seeking ties.
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SOCIAL CLOSURE
Based upon prior research, it is possible to distinguish, in at least two
ways, whether or not contacts are embedded in networks of relations
characterized by social closure. The first way is through information flows,
and the second is through sanctioning methods.
Information Flow
Within network structures characterized by social closure, information
flows through an intricate communication network in the form of “gossip,
slander, invective, and confidentiality” (Suttles 1968, p. 105). However,
within structures of relations that are less effective at facilitating coop-
eration, information flow is decidedly less elaborate. Individuals know of
their potential exchange partners’ habits and behaviors in large part be-
cause they either see these behaviors and actions themselves or their
potential partners inform them in one-on-one conversations. Trusters are
much less likely to have other sources to confirm or deny trustees’ pre-
sentation of self, and thus are less likely to have the information they
need to make well-informed decisions regarding who to trust and to assist.
Interestingly, there was very little variation in how job contacts received
information concerning their job-seeking ties’ reputations. The over-
whelming majority based their decisions on information they had gleaned
in two ways. They either knew of job seekers’ past behaviors and actions
because they had observed these firsthand, or, in cases where contacts
had little information to go on, they would engage job seekers in lengthy
conversations in order to gather bits of information they believed would
provide a more accurate picture of their job seekers’ character. In other
words, through one-on-one encounters, contacts sought to reduce infor-
mation asymmetries. In these data, information about job seekers’ rep-
utation rarely filtered through an intricate communication system. When
queried about how they knew what they did or how they would go about
finding the information they needed, just one other respondent replied in
the way that Yvonne O’Neill did. Yvonne explained that her information
was “based on knowing them personally. Or, uh, asking about them, like
‘Does she go to work? What does she do? What did she do all day? What
did she do with her time?’” In other words, she would refer to others in
her network for information about job seekers’ past actions and behaviors,
if she lacked firsthand knowledge.
This was not the case for the overwhelming majority of contacts, how-
ever. Instead, the majority most often limited their assistance to close
friends and family members, because these were the people about whom
they had firsthand knowledge upon which to make reasonable assessments
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of trustworthiness. Recall Vincent Roberts’s declaration, “I would say
family members, you know, because I know them better. Be around them.
You know, it’s more easier, okay.” Job contacts most preferred to assist
close relations because closeness provided access to firsthand knowledge
about job seekers’ past actions and behaviors outside the context of the
relationship, thus reducing information asymmetries that made it difficult
to ascertain the level of risk to which they were exposing themselves by
providing assistance.
When contacts did not have firsthand knowledge of their job-seeking
ties’ reputations, they would seek out information they needed to deter-
mine trustworthiness—and thus, whether or not to assist—not by con-
tacting interconnected trusted friends, family members, and acquain-
tances, but by engaging job seekers in lengthy conversations. Typical were
comments such as, “Ask the person,” and “I just asked a lot of questions
[of job seekers].” By engaging job seekers in lengthy conversations that
resembled, in many ways, a job interview, contacts believed that they
could ascertain job seekers’ trustworthiness and thus accurately calculate
the risk they might incur if they were to assist.
This is how Annette Charles approached this dilemma. At the time of
her interview, Annette was 28 years old, unmarried, without children,
and working part time doing clerical work at a community college. Not
only was Annette concerned about the effect that a bad referral might
have on her reputation, she was also concerned about whether or not she
would enjoy having the job seeker on the job with her. For both of these
reasons, she felt it important to ascertain as much about job seekers’
reputation as possible, and she did so by engaging them in conversations
that would elicit bits of information that would provide her with a more
accurate picture of job seekers’ character and intentions. She explained,
“I’ll get to talking to them, and if they have a good, you know, standing,
then, you know, I’ll go up to somebody and say, ‘You know, for this
position, I know somebody who can do this.’”
Similarly, Sally Lowe, a 24-year-old high school dropout and single
mother of a toddler, was very concerned about job seekers’ reputations,
especially after having been burned by a previous referral, the sister of
her son’s father. After this experience, she reported, “I’m still going to
help people, [but] I’ll get into your background a little more and all that.”
When asked how she planned to delve more into job seekers’ back-
grounds, she did not refer to others in her network as a primary source
of information. Instead, she said the following,
Just talk, openly talk to them, and open the conversation, you know. Talk
about myself, and hey, if you got something similar to it, open your mouth
and let me know. Let me know what’s going on with you, because I’d
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rather know if you’re my friend, or you’re my buddy, I’d rather know how
your life was and how your life is now, than to be trying to go and guess,
you know. Because, a friend, if you’re my friend and I’m trying to be your
friend, I need to know as much as I can about you because we have this
friendship. And, if something goes wrong, I want to be able, if you don’t
have anybody else, to come and say, ‘Yeah, you know, this is my friend.
I’m here to help her. I’m here to give her the strength she needs, you know.’
I would rather you open up to me than for me to have to wait and see and
find out later on that you’re just not right.
Here again one is struck by the lack of reference to a network of ties that
could potentially provide Sally with the information she requires in order
to make determinations about who to assist. Instead, she makes assess-
ments based on one-on-one conversations with potential exchange part-
ners, conversations that while potentially illuminating, are also potentially
rife with disingenuousness and exploitation. Indeed, this is why one seeks
the counsel of others, so as to gain additional information that either
confirms or disproves characterizations that people make of themselves.
However, like Sally, contacts in this position rarely mentioned the counsel
they received from others in their network.
What this pattern indicates is that contacts are largely determining the
trustworthiness of others in isolation, to a great extent, outside of the
context of a vibrant or intricate information network. What rarely showed
up in these data were references to knowing or determining others’ rep-
utations by chatting, gossiping, or sharing information with others in their
network or community. Instead, communication most often occurred
within the dyad. The sheer absence of intricate communication networks
was most salient, indicating that people relied relatively little on others
to monitor the behavior of those with whom they had dealings. This is
not indicative of embeddedness in closed networks, as there was little
evidence of a flow of information from dense, overlapping, or close-knit
relations.
Sanctions
Without an intricate communication network, community- or network-
backed sanctions were unlikely, and this is what the data suggest as well.
Within closed structures, sanctions for noncompliance occur on the col-
lective level, including social exclusion from all things social and economic.
Outside of closed networks, sanctions take place within the dyad, in the
form of withdrawal from future exchanges and/or the relationship. While
these data provide overwhelming evidence that sanctioning occurred
within the dyad, there was absolutely no indication that sanctioning was
backed by the collective, be that the network of relations or the community
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of relations. When job seekers failed to fulfill their obligations, as hap-
pened frequently, contacts most often responded by withdrawing from
future exchanges of that type, refusing to provide job-finding assistance
to job seekers who had forsaken them, and, as with Jackie York and
Terrance Blackburn, eventually refusing to assist anyone at all. As evi-
dence, one-fourth of contacts reported having been burned by previous
referrals—referrals failed to show after a few days, acted boorishly on the
job, and/or stole from employers, for instance. For all but one of these
job contacts—Laura Odom—referrals’ transgressions were managed by
pledging not to assist these particular job seekers again with job infor-
mation and influence. However, most maintained relations on some terms,
even if to a lesser degree than before—no contacts reported ending re-
lationships for their ties’ misdeeds. After his referral “brought the street
to the job,” for instance, Gary Hanson shared that while he would no
longer consider working with his former co-worker, they were still good
friends.
This form of sanctioning is consistent with that which occurs within
the dyad, not in communities in which norms of cooperativeness prevail.
If the latter were true, we would expect contacts to discuss how the job
seeker had been excluded from social functions and economic opportu-
nities by the network or the community. No one shared this type of
information. There appeared to be no sanctions backed by the community
that the debtor had to bear. Only the less severe sanctions of withdrawal
from contacts were enforced. Here again, informal structures supporting
trustworthiness appear weak, if not absent.
In summary, these data indicate that in the context of job finding, social
capital activation among the black urban poor is not a function of social
closure. That there was so little variation in how job contacts learned of
their job-seeking ties’ reputations, and the way they appeared to sanction
those who failed to behave as expected—both indications of the extent
to which contacts were embedded in closed networks—strongly suggest
that social closure was not a defining factor in whether or not job contacts
would provide assistance. The question is, Does this also negate the sig-
nificance of residing in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage? This
is a pertinent question because social disorganization theory posits that
concentrated disadvantage acts through network structures to affect out-
comes like cooperation.
CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE
Community SES was related to orientation to and concerns about pro-
viding job-finding assistance (see table 6). While 47% of contacts from
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TABLE 6
Job-Finding Assistance Orientation and Concerns, by Community SES
Orientation/Concern Total
Low–Moderate
Poverty
Concentrated
Disadvantage
% open to providing assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 47 21
% will help all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17 8
% concerned with job seekers’ reputation . . . . . 70 67 82
% concerned with work reputation . . . . . . . . . . 38 39 42
% concerned with ghetto reputation . . . . . . . . . 43 37 54
% burned by previous referral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 21 41
Note.— .Np 103
low-to-moderate (low) poverty neighborhoods expressed a general open-
ness to providing job-finding assistance, just 21% of contacts from high-
to-extreme (high) poverty neighborhoods did. Indeed, while 17% of con-
tacts from low-poverty neighborhoods reported that they would be willing
to help all who requested job-finding assistance, just 8% of contacts from
high-poverty neighborhoods did.
What explains this difference in orientation? Examining properties of
the network, the difference cannot be explained by variation in network
embeddedness. Using information flow and sanctioning approaches as
proxies for embeddedness in closed networks, I discovered that residents
of neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage were not
less likely than residents of less disadvantaged neighborhoods to be em-
bedded in closed networks. Indeed, so few contacts—two—appeared em-
bedded in closed networks that it could not explain differences in the
likelihood of assisting. Residents of low-poverty neighborhoods appeared
to be just as embedded in loosely connected networks of relations in which
information flow was disjointed and sanctioning took place within the
dyad. Thus, in these data, the relationship between concentrated disad-
vantage and job-finding assistance is not mediated by variations in the
degree of social closure.
There are important correlations to consider, however. First, 70% of
all respondents expressed distrust regarding job seekers’ use of their
names, and thus their reputations, to gain employment at their place of
work. However, a noticeably higher percentage of contacts who resided
in a context of concentrated disadvantage expressed this fear than did
those from low-poverty neighborhoods—82% versus 67%. Furthermore,
contacts who feared that their job-seeking ties would behave badly and
ruin their reputations expressed far greater reluctance, generally, to pro-
vide job-finding assistance. While 73% of contacts who distrusted how
others would perform in the job generally took a reluctant approach to
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providing assistance, just 35% of those without this concern were as
reluctant.
Second, contacts residing in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvan-
tage had good reason to be reluctant. Compared to those living in low-
poverty neighborhoods, a higher percentage of the former had been
burned by their referrals. Indeed, although roughly one-fifth of residents
of low-poverty neighborhoods had been negatively affected by providing
assistance, almost half of residents from neighborhoods of concentrated
disadvantage had had a similar negative experience. This is noteworthy
because whereas residents of neighborhoods characterized by concen-
trated disadvantage represented less than one-third of the sample, they
were almost 46% of those who had been burned by prior referrals.
Consistent with concerns of being burned, when asked how they de-
termined whether or not to assist their job-seeking ties, a higher percentage
of contacts from high-poverty neighborhoods made determinations based
on job seekers’ personal reputation—specifically, whether or not job seek-
ers were deemed to be ghetto. Whereas 54% assessed whether or not they
would assist using this criterion, just 37% of those from low-poverty
neighborhoods did the same. However, they were no more concerned than
were residents of low-poverty neighborhoods about job-seekers’ reputa-
tion. Whereas 39% of the latter used this criterion to judge their job-
seeking ties, 42% of the former did.
That residents of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty were far more
concerned about “ghetto” behavior is likely attributable less to any in-
herent differences in how people assess trustworthiness than to differences
in the types of issues that arise for contacts whose socio-structural positions
differ. In neighborhoods in which rates of poverty are high to extreme,
and in which a significant minority of residents are unemployed or out
of the labor market altogether, “ghetto behavior” is more prevalent and
perceived to be so. And while the majority of residents in such neigh-
borhoods do not act ghetto, residents undoubtedly employ this distinction
to ferret out, in various contexts, those who can and cannot be trusted.
Indeed, this is what Elijah Anderson’s (1990, 1999) work shows. Thus,
residents of neighborhoods in which rates of poverty were low tomoderate
likely encountered these behaviors to a lesser extent and thus were less
likely to employ this criterion to assess whether or not they would assist.
In other words, because they reside in less risky social environments, they
were less likely to perceive job-finding assistance as a risky endeavor.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The employment problems of the black urban poor have largely been
attributed to a lack of jobs (Kasarda 1995; Wilson 1987), to cultural
deficiencies (Mead 1992, 1985; Murray 1984), and to employer discrimi-
nation (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2002; Pager 2002; Turner et al. 1991).
This study implicates another factor that has not yet been fully considered.
Personal contacts represent a major conduit of employment information
and influence in the United States, matching roughly half of all job seekers
to employers. Conventional wisdom now has it that the black urban poor
are less efficacious in this regard because job seekers, suffering from social
isolation, have very limited access to ties of social worth. However the
findings of this study suggest that access explains only one part of the
puzzle, at best. Instead, the social capital deficiencies apparent among the
black urban poor seem to have to do more with activation or mobilization
than with access. In other words, even when information is available and
contacts can influence hires, they often do not. That job contacts express
such great reluctance to provide the type of job-finding assistance that
facilitates employment adds an additional layer of understanding to this
complex and persistent problem. The following quotation illustrates this
point: “If they get the job, in the first couple of weeks or so, everything
seems to be fine, or maybe even the first 90 days but somehow when they
get past that, you see a definite, a marked difference. . . . They tend to
laziness or there’s something there. I’ve seen this pattern over and over
again, you know. I think people are willing to give them a chance and
then they get the chance and then it’s like they really don’t want to work.”
Although strikingly similar to the views expressed by my job contacts,
this statement was made by an employer interviewed for the Urban Pov-
erty and Family Life Study’s survey of Chicago-area employers, quoted
by William Julius Wilson in When Work Disappears (1996, p. 118). Re-
sembling the distrusting job contacts described in this study, employers
expected from black job seekers, especially males, tardiness and absen-
teeism, unreliability, and an unwillingness to work when on the job. Fur-
thermore, they believed that the probability of theft, cursing, fighting,
and disrespecting authority were greatly enhanced with black hires rel-
ative to other racial and ethnic groups (Kirschenman and Neckerman
1991; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996; Wilson 1996).
Given these similarities in perspective, it should come as no surprise
that job contacts expressed great reluctance to assist their job-seeking ties.
Nor should it come as a surprise that the factors that facilitated assistance
among job contacts were very similar to those that affected employers’
decisions about who to hire. As with employers, contacts were displeased
by job seekers who transitioned in and out of jobs frequently, who were
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habitually absent or tardy, or who had poor work attitudes. Furthermore,
they were also concerned about whether or not their job-seeking tieswould
“bring the street to the job,” which included, among other things, showing
the effects of alcohol and drug abuse, acting raucously and boisterously,
stealing, and intimidating authority figures and co-workers. As a result,
job contacts overwhelmingly made determinations about whether or not
to assist based on their job-seeking ties’ reputations, both at work and
home, as these provided contacts with some indication of how their job-
seeking ties might behave on the job. Job seekers’ status mattered little,
however. Contacts were far less concerned that a job-seeking tie was
unemployed, for instance, than they were about the reason behind the
unemployment, reasons that time and again implicated job seekers’
reputations.
Another factor mattered less than anticipated. Drawing from social
exchange theory, one could have expected that tie strength would be of
greater importance that it was. However, when deciding whether and
how much to assist, contacts based the bulk of their decision not on their
history of past exchanges with potential exchange partners or what they
might gain from job seekers in the future, but on job seekers’ history of
work and personal habits. Thus, contacts’ close relations—siblings, best
friends, and others with whom contacts presumably had extensive ex-
changes—were often forsaken if evidence existed that they were either
not up to the task or would not represent their contacts well. These
decisions had little to do with the history of relations between contact
and job seeker, except that it provided contacts with the information they
needed to assess trustworthiness and thus the risk they might undertake
by providing assistance.
Job contacts paid so much attention to the reputations of their job-
seeking ties because of the potential damage job seekers might do to their
own reputations. Indeed, it was the interaction between the two—job
contacts’ and job seekers’ reputations—that seemed to matter most in
their determinations, consistent with Robert Wilson’s (1985) treatment of
the concept. It was noteworthy that contacts with stellar reputations on
the job, like Wilson Smith, were generally open to providing job-finding
assistance, while those who had tarnished their reputations in the eyes of
their employers, like Terrance Blackburn, were patently against providing
assistance. What was striking, however, were the narratives provided by
contacts like Jackie York and Jeremy Jessup. Both began providing re-
ferrals while in good standing with their employers, and because they
were held in high regard initially, they were willing to influence a few
questionable hires. As these hires failed to work out, both of their rep-
utations became tarnished, and they became increasingly reluctant to
recommend any of their friends for jobs, deeming the process inherently
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risky. Jackie eventually lost the confidence of her employer; Jeremy lost
his job. As a result of potential outcomes like these, both job seekers’ and
job contacts’ reputations dominated contacts’ concerns about whether or
not to assist.
There was a contingency to reputational concerns, however. Even for
job seekers of ill repute, job contacts could be mobilized if their levels of
social and economic stability were very low. Those who perceived their
situations to be dire, like Laura and, initially, Jackie, were willing to
provide assistance to anyone who came along, regardless of reputation,
hoping that those assisted would quickly become sources of social and
material support. Contacts less overwhelmed by their circumstances be-
cause they had greater personal, social, or material sources to draw upon
were less likely to come to the aid of others without regard to reputation.
However, status did not affect social capital activation in the way that
we might expect. There was no indication in the data that job contacts
were reluctant to assist because they were too ashamed to admit that they
were employed in positions of low status and esteem.
Other individual-level properties of the job contact mattered as well.
Whether or not job contacts could be mobilized for job-finding assistance
was also affected by their history of prior attempts to assist. Specifically,
job contacts for whom attempts to intercede were met with job seekers’
disengagement were far less open to providing assistance than thosewhose
history of assistance included successful matches of motivated job seekers.
After a time, the former became like discouraged workers—they even-
tually stopped trying to assist, perceiving the activity to be a waste of
time because they deemed job seekers too unmotivated to take advantage
of the information they had to offer or the influence they could wield.
Job contacts were similar to employers in at least one other way. Pre-
vious research indicates that to avoid black job seekers (employers’ proxy
for poor-quality workers), inner-city employers selectively recruited by
advertising job vacancies in neighborhood newspapers that were not
widely distributed in poor black communities (Neckerman and Kirsch-
enman 1991; Wilson 1996). Likewise, distrusting job contacts in this study
avoided potential bad referrals by informing only those whom they
deemed “worthy” of their information and influence, while deceiving the
“unworthy” about vacancies or routing them to employment opportunities
at other firms. Just as employers reported spending a great deal of time
interviewing black job seekers to assess their commitment to employment
(Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991),11 so too did job contacts engage job
11 Although employers in the Chicago-area study indicated that they take extra time
and care to interview black job applicants to assess their willingness to work, audit
studies suggest that employers actually take less time and are less engaged with black
Social Capital and Job-Finding Assistance
47
seekers in long conversations, hoping to elicit information that would help
them determine whether or not job seekers were resolute, with some
contacts requiring job seekers to supply re´sume´s as evidence of their
resolve before they agreed to assist. Given prior research, there is little
doubt that employers are skeptical of the work ethic of the black urban
poor, question their motivation, and fear the ghetto among them. At the
very least, this is the rationale they provide for their great reluctance to
hire from this pool of applicants. Until this study, however, no treatment
has examined systematically the extent to which these same perceptions
prevail among the black urban poor and inform the decisions that they
make about whether and how to assist their job-seeking ties. As such,
this study represents an important empirical contribution.
This study contributes conceptually as well. While there exists a wide
variety of earlier investigations that suggest that the factors favorable to
social capital activation operate at multiple levels, to date there has been
no single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand
social capital activation. In addition to the individual- and dyadic-level
properties mentioned above, decisions to assist were also contingent on
the SES of contacts’ community of residence. Residents of neighborhoods
characterized by concentrated disadvantage were more concerned about
the reputations of their job-seeking ties than were residents of low-poverty
neighborhoods. Consistent with this trend, they were generally less open
to providing job-finding assistance as well, perceiving greater risk in as-
sisting for at least two reasons. First, residence in communities of con-
centrated disadvantage put them into much more regular and frequent
contact with individuals whose reputations would be called into ques-
tion—those whose behavior would be deemed ghetto. Second, they were
more likely to have been burned in the past by job-seeking ties who, in
different ways, behaved offensively. Thus, for them, job seekers were
generally seen as untrustworthy, and providing job-finding assistance was
more likely socially constructed as a risky endeavor.
However, there was little evidence to implicate social closure, as pro-
posed by James Coleman (1988, 1990) and others. Far from dense, over-
lapping, and close-knit, networks were, by and large, open and free-
floating structures. This trend varied little, regardless of contacts’
orientation to providing job-finding assistance, a point that is somewhat
surprising for two reasons. First, prior work has shown that structures
of embeddedness have important effects on cooperative efforts among
those sharing a network of relations. As an example, Uehara (1990) showed
that network structures affect the ability and willingness of recently job-
applicants than with comparable white applicants at every stage of the recruitment
and screening process (Turner, Fix, and Struyk 1991).
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less, poor, black women to mobilize their ties for instrumental aid, with
network structures characterized by social closure facilitating this type of
assistance. Second, to the extent that community SES is believed tomatter,
structures of embeddedness are theorized to be the mediating factor. Social
disorganization theory informs us that community SES affects both the
density of network relations—the extent to which networks can be char-
acterized as closed—and the links between local institutions within com-
munities, and that these then shape the development and maintenance
of common values and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation
and community problem-solving behaviors among residents.
Because of proxies that I used to determine social closure, I cannot say
with certainty that these particular findings are beyond dispute. However,
there is reason to believe that what I report is accurate, without disputing
the larger claim that network structures can either facilitate or inhibit
cooperation among those who share network relations. First, although
previous research finds that greater closure leads to greater cooperation,
we also know that residents of urban communities are far less likely to
be embedded in closed networks—those that are dense, overlapping, and
close-knit—than are residents of small towns or rural communities (Amato
1993; Cook and Hardin 2001; Fischer 1982). In other words, we would
not expect a great deal of social closure among residents of urban com-
munities. This does not mean, however, that cooperation does not occur
among residents of urban communities. Instead, as Cook and Hardin
explain, “In more urban settings the networks individuals form to establish
relationships of social exchange and cooperation (or merely to coordinate
joint activity) tend to be more specialized, less multiplex, more sparsely
connected, and more numerous” (2001, p. 336). Thus, while I would not
exclude measures of social closure from a model of social capital acti-
vation, I would argue that its relevance would be highly contingent on
the social context within which cooperation is predicted to occur—urban
or rural, for instance.
Second, although community social organization theory assumes that
“locality-based social networks constitute the core social fabric of human
ecological communities” (Sampson and Groves 1989, p. 779), the growing
complexity of modern life increasingly calls this assumption into question.
Nowadays, individuals’ close relations, whether close friends or family
members, are far less likely than in the past to reside in the same neigh-
borhood (Amato 1993). Indeed, some would argue that the suburbs have
thrived in part because, when given the option, people opt out of such
dense, overlapping, and close-knit relations whose obligations once en-
cumbered them (Sennett and Cobb 1972). What this means is that com-
munity social organization can and probably does act on outcomes like
cooperation and collective efficacy through some other mechanism than
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dense networks of relations. Indeed, I would argue that even though the
residents of low-poverty neighborhoods in my sample were similarly em-
bedded in open, free-floating networks of relations, because they lived in
neighborhoods in which crime and deviance were less prevalent, they
perceived themselves to be in less risky circumstances and thus were
generally more likely to be mobilized for assistance. Thus, controlling for
network closure, community SES can act on cooperation and collective
efficacy by affecting residents’ perceptions of the risk that they face at
the hands of those around them because of the environment in which
they live.
Finally, although this project does not speak directly to racial and ethnic
differences in the efficaciousness of social capital, it does motivate future
research centered on this question.What the findings reported here suggest
is that relative to other racial and ethnic groups, poor, urban blacks are
less likely to benefit from their network of relations, not so much because
they lack access than because their networks are less likely to be mobilized
for assistance. This work lays the groundwork for future research designed
to test such hypotheses rigorously. Thus, not only may we wish to explain
racial and ethnic differences in status attainment in terms of accessed and
mobilized models of social capital, as has been done quite extensively to
date; we may also explain these differences in terms of the likelihood of
activating the contacts to whom individuals are connected, problematizing
properties of the individuals involved in the exchange, such as the rep-
utation (work and personal) and motivation of the job seeker, and the
reputation, status, and general inclination to assist of the job contact.
Properties of the dyad should not be ignored either. Instead, we may
consider the strength and length of job contacts’ relationships with their
job-seeking ties. We would also problematize properties of the community,
taking into consideration the community’s SES, and, consistent with Co-
leman’s (1990) approach, the size of the community as well. And, despite
the lack of evidence in this study, we may also problematize properties
of the network, taking into consideration such measures as density, in-
tensity, and encapsulation. This multilevel approach to understanding
social capital activation provides a fruitful avenue for future research and
promises to fill many empirical and conceptual gaps that currently exist
in the literature.
Indeed, the findings reported here encourage a different and potentially
instructive interpretation of findings from prior work. I employ two stud-
ies as examples. First, Green, Tigges, and Diaz (1999) compared three
methods of assistance employed by job contacts—informing job seekers
about vacancies, talking to employers on job seekers’ behalf, or hiring
job seekers—and found that blacks were significantly less likely to have
job contacts assist proactively during the matching process. Second, Hol-
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zer (1987) found that roughly one-fifth of the black-white racial difference
in the probability of a young person gaining employment could be ex-
plained by differences in receiving offers after having searched through
friends and relatives. When black youths searched through friends and
relatives, they were less likely to be offered employment than were their
white counterparts. In the former case, blacks’ relative lack of access was
implicated. In the latter, no clear explanation was offered. However, in
both studies, it may be that properties of the individual, dyad, network,
and community may further disadvantage those in low-wage labor mar-
kets where employers rely heavily on contacts for recruitment and screen-
ing. Indeed, this perspective may help to explain why, among African-
Americans, social support networks often lag behind those of other racial
and ethnic groups in terms of expressive aid, such as advice giving, and
instrumental aid, such as money lending or giving (Eggebeen 1992; Eg-
gebeen and Hogan 1990; Green, Hammer, and Tigges 2000; Hofferth 1984;
Morgan 1982; Parish, Hao, and Hogan 1991), despite research from the
1970s describing strong obligations of exchange within poor black com-
munities (McAdoo 1980; Stack 1974).
APPENDIX A
Data Collection Strategies
As is often the case when studying low-income populations, the principal
investigators of this project had great difficulty recruiting participants
through random sampling techniques, although great effort was made to
do so (Edin and Lein 1997). In the summer of 1999, we contacted
GENESYS Sampling Systems, a service that provided us with publicly
listed names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 350 randomly selected
residents from a poor census tract. Although we had initially thought to
restrict the sampling to those ages 25–34 (the 1990 census indicated that
there were 379 residents in this census tract ages 25–34), because there
were so few listings for residents in this age group (48 records), we broad-
ened our criteria. From GENESYS, we received the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of 350 residents. We attempted to contact residents
with the phone numbers we had been given, but found ourselves facing
three major obstacles: many lines were no longer in service, residents had
moved, and many households did not have a resident matching our cri-
teria. Thus, from August to December 1999, we had a yield of only nine
interviews.
Our next approach involved canvassing the community and recording
every address for every housing structure. We then mailed recruitment
letters asking respondents to participate and promised to provide a $25
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incentive for participation. This method generated only two additional
interviews.
Our third strategy involved canvassing the community, by going door-
to-door and requesting participation. We began canvassing the area’s
housing projects with the intent of working our way through all of the
housing projects in this community. Canvassing usually took place be-
tween 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Although few people who fit the criteria
refused to participate when asked, we were presented with some chal-
lenges. The projects that housed the most disadvantaged residents were
relatively unsafe. Gang activity, including drug dealing, occurred con-
spicuously. Violent crime was so prevalent that few residents that we
spoke with would allow their children to play outside or would venture
outside themselves except to leave the neighborhood. Furthermore, res-
idents would often refuse to answer their doors. Many had eviction notices
posted on their doors and may have thought that we were bill collectors.
We also believed that some did not want interviewers to see their homes.
Self-conscious of her dwelling, one respondent requested that we conduct
the interview in her barely functioning car.
Because we perceived ourselves to be in some danger, and because
many residents clearly had issues of trust where interviewers were con-
cerned, we then decided to recruit residents from social service agencies,
where the more semi-public arena would reassure interviewerswho feared
for their safety, as well as reassure residents who feared for their own
well-being. From contacts in the area, we discovered two social service
agencies—one catered to residents experiencing various housing issues
and provided some employment assistance as well; the other agency (the
center) was most fruitful, yielding the bulk of our 105 interviews con-
ducted (71) between August 2000 and June 2002. In all, 72% were re-
cruited at both social service agencies. During this time, interviewers took
up residence at the center’s office during regular business hours. With the
assistance of center staff, they approached prospective subjects who fit
the study’s criteria and requested their participation. The response rate
was fairly high—roughly 80%.
There may be some concern that respondents recruited in the early
stages of the project differed from those recruited through the social ser-
vice agencies. Comparing the full sample to center-recruited respondents,
I found minor differences in terms of mean age, number of children, and
hourly wages (see app. table A1). There were also minor differences in
the percentage who had children and received public assistance.However,
a lower percentage of the center-recruited sample was female, was ever
married, graduated from high school, was employed, and was a resident
of a high-to-extreme poverty neighborhood. A higher percentage was cur-
rently on public assistance, but a lower percentage had ever received
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TABLE A1
Mean Sample Characteristics by Data Collection Strategy
Variable
Full Sample
( )Np 103
Random
Sample
( )Np 27
Center-Recruited
Sample
( )Np 76
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.4 30.1 27.8
(5.9) (5.5) (6.0)
Gender (female) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 .67 .46
Never married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 .67 .83
Have children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 .74 .75
No. of children (if parent) . . . . . . 2.5 2.6 2.5
(1.4) (1.1) (1.5)
High school graduate/GED . . . . . . . .84 1.0 .78
Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 .89 .36
Hourly wages (in dollars) . . . . . . . . . . 9.30 8.57 9.57
(3.5) (2.8) (3.7)
Public assistance:
Currently receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 .19 .36
Ever received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 .58 .40
Neighborhood poverty rate:
Low–moderate poverty . . . . . . . . . .67 .37 .78
High–extreme poverty . . . . . . . . . . .33 .63 .22
TABLE A2
Percentage of Center-Recruited Expressing Concerns about Providing Job-
Finding Assistance
Concern Full Sample
Center-Recruited
Sample
Major concerns about job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 84
Job seekers are too unmotivated . . . . . . . . . . . 20 13
Job seekers are too needy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
Job seekers are prone to delinquency . . . . . . 70 71
Note.— .Np 76
assistance. Thus, these different sampling methods yielded individuals
from somewhat different populations.
To determine whether this influences findings, I recalculated the mean
percentage of respondents who distrust, by demographic characteristics,
for the center-recruited sample only. Results are displayed in appendix
table A2. However, differences were minor, changing in no substantive
way the findings reported in the main text.
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APPENDIX B
Job-Finding Questions
Now I’d like to ask a few questions about finding work.
1. In general, how difficult would you say it is to find a job, any job?
a. How difficult would you say it is now to find a good job?
2. What obstacles have you had finding work?
3. How important is it to use friends, relatives, and acquaintances to
find out about job opportunities?
4. When you hear about job openings at your workplace or elsewhere,
what do you do? In other words, do you tell the people you know
about them? Explain.
5. Have you ever gone to anyone you know to ask about job opportu-
nities for yourself or anyone else you know? (If no, go to question no.
6.)
a. Who did you ask and why did you ask this person?
b. What does she/he do for a living and what types of jobs could
she/he help you find?
c. Would you say that she/he has influence or power on the job?
d. Has this person helped you on more than one occasion?
e. How did this person help?
f. Did you get the job?
g. Would you have been able to get this job without the help of this
person?
6. Has anyone ever come to you for help in finding or getting a job?
a. Who has come to you for help and why?
b. What types of jobs did she/he/they ask about?
c. How did you help, if at all?
d. Would you help again?
e. Did this/these job seeker(s) get the job(s)?
7. Now I want you to think about situations in which you have helped
someone to find a job. Once the job seeker has been hired for the job,
to what extent have you helped them get accustomed to the job?
8. When people you know approach you for help in finding work, how
do you determine whether you will help or not?
9. What do you think are the positive aspects of helping others to find
work?
10. What do you think are the negative aspects of trying to help others
to find work?
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11. I want you to think about all of your family, friends, and acquain-
tances. Is there a specific person that you know who is helpful in
finding work for others?
a. Who is this person?
b. What types of jobs?
c. What does she/he do for a living?
12. Finally, for young adults moving from school to work, what advice
would you give about how to find jobs?
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